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Executive Summary
Introduction to the Conflict Research 
Programme
The Conflict Research Programme (CRP) is a three-year 
programme funded by the UK Department of International 
Development (DFID) designed to address the drivers and 
dynamics of violent conflict in the Middle East and Africa, 
and to inform the measures being used to tackle armed 
conflict and its impacts. 
The overall goal of the CRP is to provide an evidence-based 
strategic reorientation of international engagement in plac-
es apparently afflicted by the world’s most intractable vio-
lent conflicts. Its premise is that in these places, the ability 
of public authorities to provide even the most basic level of 
governance is subject to the functioning of the ‘real politics’ 
of gaining, managing and holding power, which we argue 
functions as a ‘political marketplace’. This approach helps 
explain the frustrations of state-building and institutional-
ly-focused engagement; it can also inform the design of 
improved interventions, which reduce the risk and impact 
of conflict and violence in developing countries, alleviating 
poverty and insecurity. 
The locations for research are Democratic Republic of Con-
go, Syria, Somalia, South Sudan, Iraq and the wider Middle 
East. Our central hypothesis is that governance in these 
difficult places is dominated by the logic of a political mar-
ketplace. These political markets are turbulent, violent and 
integrated into regional and global networks of power and 
money. We also hypothesise that moral populism (most 
visible in identity politics, persecuting ideologies and violent 
extremism) is a counterpart to the marketisation of politics, 
and the two flourish in conditions of persistent uncertainty, 
conflict and trauma. Current policy frameworks and tools 
can neither capture the everyday realities of politics and 
governance, nor adjust to the dynamics of contested power 
relations. External interventions risk being enmeshed in 
logics of power and may end up inadvertently supporting 
violence and authoritarianism. At the same time, in all war-
torn spaces, there are relatively peaceful zones: what we 
term ‘pockets of civicness’. These might be territorial (local 
ceasefires, or inclusive local authorities), social (civil society 
groups helping the vulnerable or countering sectarian narra-
tives, or customary courts solving disputes fairly) or exter-
nal (interventions that regulate flows of political finance).
The CRP will generate evidence-based research on the 
dynamics of conflict, contestation, ‘civicness’ and pub-
lic authority, enabling better interventions to manage 
and resolve armed conflict, reduce violence, and create 
conditions for more accountable and transparent govern-
ance. A core component of the CRP is to contribute to a 
better understanding of ‘what works’ in addressing violent 
conflict across our research sites. We will develop compar-
ative understanding of how different interventions affect 
violent conflict and the risk of renewed conflict across 
our research sites. We will also examine the contextual 
factors that affect the effectiveness of these interventions. 
Intervention areas selected for comparative research are: 
security interventions; civil society and community media-
tion interventions; resource interventions; and interventions 
designed to strengthen authority and legitimacy, including 
at the sub-national level. We envisage emerging findings 
from our political economy analysis of conflict drivers to 
shape our comparative analysis of specific interventions. 
We have a unique and robust infrastructure of local 
researchers and civil society networks across all our sites 
that will facilitate both fieldwork research and remote re-
search. The CRP team is already closely engaged with key 
political processes – and regional actors  – in the countries 
concerned, designed to promote peace, humanitarian 
action, human rights and democracy. This engagement is a 
key part of our method and will ensure that evidence-based 
research is effectively communicated to institutions 
engaged in trying to reduce the risk and impact of violent 
conflict in our research sites. Our emphasis is upon a mix 
of research methods and mechanisms for engaging in 
policy and practice.
CRP Research on Iraq
It has now been over a year since the liberation of Mosul by 
Iraqi government forces in July 2017. This victory marks a 
new stage in the violent conflict that has destabilised Iraq 
since regime change in 2003. In some ways, this break-
through can be compared firstly to the initial aftermath 
of the invasion itself from April 2003 until the insurgency 
transformed itself into a civil war in 2005, and secondly 
to the period following the US-led surge which started in 
February 2007 and lasted until the reconstitution of Daʿesh1 
and the fall of Mosul in 2014. As with the invasion and the 
surge, the organisational capacity of violent opposition to 
the post-2003 political order was shattered by the de-
ployment of superior military force. The aftermath of this 
successful military campaign clearly represents a window 
of opportunity where a sudden reduction in politically 
1  Daʿesh is an Arabic acronym referring to the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS), now officially known as the Islamic State (IS). These 
terms are used interchangeably in the paper. 
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motivated violence offers the Government of Iraq (GoI) and 
its allies the opportunity to deal with long-term underly-
ing drivers of instability that have repeatedly given rise to 
organised violence since 2003.
However, as the examples of 2003 and 2007, along with 
the rapid reconstitution of Daʿesh after 2017 indicate, if 
these underlying drivers are not properly identified and 
mediated through accurately targeted policy interventions, 
then a return to the levels of organised violence that have 
dominated Iraq for the majority of the last fifteen years is 
likely. This paper is an attempt to identify those underlying 
drivers of conflict using the CRP’s four key analytical con-
cepts – moral populism, the political marketplace, public 
authority and ‘civicness’.
The CRP’s Iraq component is based at the LSE Middle 
East Centre. Professor Toby Dodge leads on the research 
in partnership with Dr Zeynep Kaya and Dr Jessica Wat-
kins. The programme is managed by Sandra Sfeir.
The CRP’s Iraqi partners are the Institute of Regional and 
International Studies (IRIS), American University of Iraq, 
Sulaimani and Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, a 
think tank based in Baghdad. IRIS and its Director, Chris-
tine M. van den Toorn, will lead research on the Kurdistan 
Regional Government, displacement and the disputed 
territories. Al-Bayan Center, led by Managing Director, Sajad 
Jiyad and Director of Studies, Ali al-Mawlawi, will research 
central government politics, administration and finances, 
the politics of resource distribution and intra-Shiʿa relations.
The rise of destructive sectarian narratives in Iraq since 
2003 will be examined through the category of moral 
populism. This refers to the social and political power 
produced by invoking exclusivist and morally-imbued iden-
tities and values, such as those characteristic of militant 
Islamist, sectarian and ethno-nationalist movements. In 
post-2003 Iraq, moral populism has taken the form of both 
radical Islamism and sectarian political mobilisation, with 
politicians seeking to divide the polity through the mobilisa-
tion of exclusivist Sunni, Shiʿa and Kurdish identities.
In the aftermath of the first national election of 2005, a 
government of national unity was formed through the 
creation of an elite pact that brought this sectarian political 
logic into government formation. The muhasasa taʾifia – or 
sectarian apportionment system – deliberately used moral 
populism to disguise the evolution of a nationwide patron-
age system (the political marketplace) and to legitimise the 
use of violence during the civil war.
The rapid reconstitution of Daʿesh shows the negative 
consequences that the muhasasa taʾifia system had on 
the Sunni section of Iraq’s polity. In the aftermath of the 
liberation of Mosul and the 2018 elections, political organ-
isations seeking to represent the Sunni populace remain 
fractured and are increasingly dominated by competing 
regional states. Given that the vast majority of Iraq’s inter-
nally displaced people are Sunni, the disorganised state of 
those seeking to mobilise and deliver them to the ballot box 
is yet another destabilising factor.
Between the fall of Mosul to Daʿesh in 2014, its liberation 
in 2017 and the national elections of 2018, there have been 
trends that have both bolstered but also undermined moral 
populism. A trend counter to moral populism is political 
mobilisation, which came to the fore in the summer of 
2015 with the spontaneous protests against power short-
ages, endemic corruption and the muhasasa taʾifia, starting 
in Basra and then spreading through to Baghdad. The 
influence of the 2015 protest movement meant that the is-
sue of corruption dominated the 2018 elections campaign. 
Muqtada al-Sadr allied with the Iraqi Communist Party to 
form the Saairun Coalition. This certainly placed the issue 
of corruption at the heart of the elections and played a 
major role in Sadr’s alliance winning the largest number of 
seats, at 54. However, it looks unlikely that Sadr can trans-
form this election victory into a meaningful and sustainable 
programme to reform the state and reduce corruption.
The emergence of the Hashd al-Shaʿabi (or Popular 
Mobilization Units, PMU), a plethora of militias primarily 
mobilised through Shiʿa identity politics, has seen the Iraqi 
state struggle to gain control over purveyors of violence. 
In 2018, the political coalition representing the majority of 
groups involved in the Hashd al-Shaʿabi, the Fateh Alliance 
won the second largest number of votes (47 seats), further 
hindering the state’s ability to control them.
In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), by pushing forward 
with the independence referendum in September 2017, 
then-President Masoud Barzani and the KDP sought to 
exacerbate Kurdish moral populism to shore up their legit-
imacy. However, the move by the Iraqi army into the dis-
puted territories claimed by both the GoI and the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG) in October 2017, indicated the 
political vulnerability of Barzani and his family’s domination 
over the KRG.
The national elections of May 2018 certainly saw a move 
away from identity-based politics to campaigning focused 
on economic and reform issues. The majority of political 
coalitions eschewed overtly sectarian rhetoric, instead 
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developing manifestos focused on how to economically 
reform the Iraqi state and deliver much needed government 
services to all. However, the low turnout, at 44.52 percent, 
indicated the alienation of the population from the politi-
cal process and the state. In addition, winning coalitions 
moved into complex negotiations to form another gov-
ernment of national unity. This means that the muhasasa 
taʾifia remains the dominant logic shaping elite politics in 
Baghdad.
The reasons behind the high levels of politically sanctioned 
corruption that have undermined Iraqi state institutions and 
government legitimacy lie in the dominant role the political 
marketplace plays in Iraqi politics. The political market-
place refers to the transactional politics through which 
loyalties and services are exchanged for material reward, 
often extracted from state resources. The Iraqi oil-funded 
political marketplace is intimately linked to the use of eth-
no-sectarian moral populism and sectarian apportionment 
promoted by the country’s ruling elite. Within the muhasasa 
taʾifia system, dominant parties use GoI payrolls to reward 
political loyalty with public sector employment, government 
contracts to enrich allied businessmen and personal theft 
from ministerial budgets. The result has been a state pay-
roll that has swelled from between 850,000 and 1.2 million 
employees in 2003 to a peak of 3 million in 2015.
The challenges to government authority at a national level 
will be examined through the analytical lens of public 
authority. Public authority is understood by the CRP as the 
structures and people who exercise governance functions, 
with a degree of consent, at any level above the family. In 
Iraq, the removal of the Baʿathist regime in 2003 led to the 
institutional collapse of the state. Sub-state organisations 
such as the Mahdi Army and Daʿesh and, after 2014, the 
Hashd al-Shaʿabi, partially filled the gap left by the state. 
The influence of the muhasasa taʾifia and the political 
marketplace has meant that public authority at state level 
is incredibly weak. The CRP will investigate whether the 
decentralisation of public authority to the provincial level is 
a more effective way of filling the vacuum caused by war 
and corruption.
In the KRG, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)’s monopolisation 
of political power and resources has meant that informal 
systems of governance prevail and have largely impeded 
the development of coherent government institutions and 
the rule of law. The CRP will examine if the domination of 
public authority in the KRG by the political marketplace 
can be challenged in the aftermath of the referendum and 
resurgence of GoI authority in the disputed territories.
Political mobilisation will be studied through the notion 
of ‘civicness’. The violent character of moral populism 
post-2003 has stifled the development of nationwide civic 
organisations. While civil society organisations have be-
come active, they operate within the constraints imposed 
by the political elite. Beyond party politics, cross-communal 
political mobilisation has been patchy and tends to focus 
on protests against government sectarianism and corrup-
tion and its appalling record of service delivery. In 2015, 
protests against the muhasasa taʾifia system originating in 
Basra spread through the south and to Baghdad, attract-
ing hundreds of thousands of protestors. Attempts by 
the Prime Minister to address demonstrators’ demands 
were largely unsuccessful and the demonstrators’ lack of 
organisational capacity left them vulnerable to co-optation 
by the Sadrist trend which led the reform movement in the 
2018 elections.
Public authority in Iraq is highly gendered and based upon 
embedded forms of patriarchy present in the running of 
public institutions, the management of war, the distribution 
of resources and the interpretation of Islamic jurispru-
dence. Iraqi public authorities reproduce and institution-
alise the gendered dimensions of moral populism in the 
shape of religious sectarianism, which in turn reinforces 
their authority. The positive causal relationship between 
women’s engagement in conflict prevention and lasting 
peace also makes it important to adopt a gender analysis.
With the aim to further deepen the analysis on the drivers 
of conflict in Iraq, the CRP–Iraq research agenda focuses 
on two additional issues: internal displacement and the 
disputed territories. These issues are both causes and out-
comes of conflict; they create further political, economic 
and social tension and have become even more significant 
in post-liberation Mosul.
Internal displacement has been central to operations of 
state power in Iraq for the past 30 years. In the post-2003 
era, displacement has accelerated under an increasingly 
fractured political landscape defined by sectarian politics. 
Heightened internal displacement between 2005 and 2008 
was a result of conflict and an absence of state-central-
ised public authority that could protect citizens. Armed 
groups relied upon sectarian violence to secure pockets of 
territory, driving members of other sectarian groups out of 
their homes to do so. The most recent wave of displace-
ment since 2014 has exacerbated an already protracted 
crisis. As of March 2018, more than 2.3 million Iraqis lived 
in a state of internal displacement. Displacement has 
weakened community and tribal power structures in some 
areas, while entrenching their authority in others. 
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The increasingly corrupt political marketplace has only 
grown stronger with the rise of the number of internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs), as political actors have distributed 
aid to IDPs on the basis of their political affiliations. IDPs in 
Iraq have generally suffered from a lack of legal protection, 
limited access to services and restrictions on freedom of 
movement.
Alongside the IDP crisis, the status of the territories disput-
ed by the GoI and the KRG, with large untapped oil reserves, 
has been one of the most intractable issues in Iraq since 
2003. For the KRG, controlling the oil reserves is essential 
for providing economic self-sufficiency and supporting 
independence. However, the reassertion of GoI control over 
the majority of these territories in October 2017 was an 
economic and strategic blow to the KRG. In the aftermath 
of this military operation, it is expected that both sides will 
continue to use a combination of coercion, corruption and 
patronage to fight for local allegiances, using ethno-politi-
cal narratives to rally Arab, Kurd and other minorities under 
exclusivist banners, portraying the disputed territories as 
vital to their integrity. The national-level GoI–KRG dispute 
over these territories has undermined, but not completely 
overshadowed, underlying grassroots initiatives that foster 
intercommunal stability and ‘civicness’.
The defeat of Daʿesh and the retaking of Kirkuk created a 
window of opportunity for Baghdad. Before the elections of 
May 2018, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi publicly commit-
ted himself to post-sectarian politics and hoped the retak-
ing of both Mosul and the disputed territories would bolster 
his popular standing. However, his inability to implement a 
reform agenda while in office directly contributed to his dis-
appointing performance in the elections. This, along with 
the low turnout, indicates that public opinion is focused on 
the need to reform the Iraqi state and its relationship with 
society and the economy, and that people will punish those 
politicians who fail to deliver change.
Introduction
The academic, journalistic and ‘grey’ literature focusing on 
the post-2003 period in Iraq is dominated by four major 
themes or analytical concerns: the cause and effect of the 
US intervention; the rise of sectarianism as a driver of politi-
cal mobilisation; the groups involved in politically motivated 
violence; and the challenges of economically and politi-
cally reforming the Iraqi state. Existing work on sectarian 
mobilisation mirrors one of the key themes of the CRP’s 
own approach to Iraq, moral populism, and our research 
will critically interact with it. The CRP’s work will also utilise 
existing work on violent groups but will expand this through 
on the ground research. This will include research on the 
Peshmerga, the reform of the Iraqi army following its 
collapse in 2014, Ministry of Interior forces after the fight 
against Daʿesh and the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service.
A central CRP–Iraq research project will examine the 
evolution and future role of the Hashd al-Shaʿabi. Our own 
work will interact with existing literature as it relates to two 
of the CRP’s central themes, public authority and moral 
populism. Finally, the CRP–Iraq will examine attempts to 
reform the state, both economically and politically. This will 
include studying the impact of International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank reform packages but also Haider al-Abadi’s 
own attempts, between 2014 and 2018, to tackle corrup-
tion, reduce the government payroll, and undermine the 
logic of the muhasasa taʾifia system by appointing ‘techno-
crats’ to government positions.
Against this background, this paper is divided into seven 
major sections that will assess the secondary literature 
that underpins the research projects that the CRP–Iraq will 
carry out over the next three years. First, it will explain the 
applicability of each of the CRP’s four major themes to Iraq, 
and how they will shape our research. It will do this by judg-
ing how existing research interacts with these themes. It 
will also appraise how those themes can be used to explain 
the past, current and future drivers of conflict. The paper 
will then offer a gender perspective on violent conflict, 
moral populism and public authority in Iraq.
In addition, each research site within the overall CRP–Iraq 
project has a limited number of context-specific drivers 
or outcomes of conflict. With this in mind, the paper will 
examine two other drivers of conflict, the estimated 2.3 
million IDPs, those driven from their homes since 2003 by 
violence who have yet to return; and the role of the disput-
ed territories after the GoI’s retaking of Kirkuk in October 
2017. Since 2003, there has been a struggle between the 
KRG and GoI for control of these areas and the popula-
tion within them. The CRP will examine how the retaking 
of Kirkuk has changed the political dynamics across the 
whole of the disputed territories and whether the GoI can 
control these territories, let alone expand its authority into 
the entire area.
Moral Populism in Iraq
For the CRP, moral populism refers to the ability to both 
mobilise and divide populations by deploying exclusivist 
religious and ethnic rhetoric. This power can be deployed 
by national politicians, militia leaders or local social 
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and political figures seeking influence. From the US-led 
invasion of March 2003 to at least the elections of 2018, 
Iraqi politics have been dominated by an overtly religious 
and ethnic sectarian moral populism. In the immediate 
aftermath of the invasion, the country was swept up in an 
insurgency against foreign occupation justified by territorial 
nationalism. However, a militant form of Sunni Islamist 
moral populism quickly infused the conflict. The fight then 
degenerated into a civil war understood by participants 
and observers in terms of violent sectarianism, with the 
assertion of exclusivist ethnic and religious identities, Shiʿa, 
Sunni and Kurd. In the aftermath of that civil war, especially 
in the run up to the 2010 elections, the large political blocs 
seeking to deploy moral populism fractured, with smaller 
coalitions and parties competing amongst themselves for 
the votes of the communities they sought to represent. 
Finally, in June 2014, Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, fell 
to the rejuvenated forces of the Islamic State who claimed 
to be recreating a transnational Sunni caliphate, seeking 
to unite all Sunni Muslims under their austere, violent and 
deeply sectarian interpretation of Islam. This, once again, 
saw an upsurge in the deployment of moral populism.
The 2018 elections saw the continuation of a process 
which fractured the ethno-sectarian political bloc. The 
election campaign was largely fought around issue-based 
not identity-based politics. The main exception to this was 
the Shiʿa-centric campaign run by Nouri al-Maliki’s State of 
Law Coalition (Iʾtilaf Dawlat al-Qanun) and the Sunni-centric 
campaign run by Osama al-Nujaifi’s Iraqi Decision Alliance 
(Tahalof al-Qarar al-Iraqi).2 In contrast, the other leading 
electoral coalitions fiercely debated their rival plans for 
reforming the economy, delivering jobs and services, and 
tackling corruption. In addition, incumbent Prime Minister 
Haider al-Abadi and one of his main rivals, Hadi al-Ameri, 
actively campaigned across the country, well beyond their 
traditional Shiʿa constituencies.
The CRP’s use of moral populism, in combination with the 
political marketplace and the notions of variable public 
authority, allows it to escape a static or transhistorical 
understanding of sectarianism as a force that has always 
mobilised Iraqis. Instead, the deployment of moral pop-
ulism as an analytical unit certainly recognises the emotive 
and political power of exclusivist appeals to ethnicity and 
religion. However, it explains this appeal in Iraq in terms 
of a collapse of national public authority. The withdrawal 
of institutional state power from society created a space 
2  ‘Iraq Votes 2018: Election Mobilisation Strategies’, Institute of Region-
al and International Studies (2018). Available at: http://auis.edu.krd/iris/
sites/default/files/IraqVotes2018_MobilizationStrategies1.pdf. 
for moral populism to be used by ethnic and sectarian 
entrepreneurs to mobilise society and for the purveyors of 
non-state violence to justify their role.
The political system put in place after regime change 
was based on an elite pact justified in terms of sectarian 
apportionment or, in Arabic, muhasasa taʾifia. This system 
deliberately used moral populism to disguise the workings 
of the political marketplace and divide Iraq’s post-2003 poli-
ty, making ethnic and religious identity the basis not only for 
voting but also for access to state resources, proffering em-
ployment and obtaining government services. As a result, 
ethnic and religious moral populism dominated political 
mobilisation, justified the role of Iraq’s new governing elite, 
and finally legitimised the use of violence in Iraq’s civil war.
It is the muhasasa taʾifia system and the governments of 
national unity it led to after every post-2003 election, that 
merged moral populism with the political marketplace. 
Leaders of the ethno-sectarian parties divided government 
ministries amongst themselves, utilising the resources the 
ministries brought, in terms of civil service payrolls and 
ministerial budgets, as patronage to solidify their own polit-
ical base. As with previous elections, the winning coalitions 
in the 2018 elections have moved into complex negotia-
tions that will eventually lead to another government of 
national unity.
Moral Populism and Shiʿa Political Identity
From 2003 until at least 2010, three main political parties, 
the Sadrist Movement, the Islamic Daʿwa Party and the 
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), sought to deploy 
moral populism to rally the Shiʿa vote in parliamentary 
elections and thus gain access to the political marketplace 
operating under the cover of the muhasasa taʾifia system. 
However, from 2010 onwards, there was a fracturing of 
the Shiʿa political field in Iraq with a proliferation of parties 
competing for the loyalty of the Shiʿa population. 
This fragmentation reached a peak after the fall of Mosul 
and the creation of the Hashd al-Shaʿabi. The legitima-
cy and resources accrued by groups within the Hashd 
al-Shaʿabi encouraged a number of more radical, Irani-
an-aligned militias to secure their role in Iraqi politics 
through military and then political mobilisation on the 
national stage. For the 2018 elections, twenty pro-Iranian 
Hashd groups formed the Fateh Alliance (Tahalof al-Fateh) 
under the leadership of Badr commander Hadi al-Ameri. 
They competed for the Shiʿa section of the electorate 
against four other electoral coalitions; Haider al-Abadi’s Vic-
tory Alliance (Iʾtilaf al-Nasr), Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law 
8        Iraq Synthesis Paper
Coalition, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saairun Coalition and Ammar 
al-Hakim’s National Wisdom Movement (Tayar al-Hikma 
al-Watani).3 
In September 2004, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani drove for-
ward the formation of the United Iraqi Alliance, an exclusiv-
ist Shiʿa electoral coalition, and gave it his blessing during 
the first national elections since regime change.4 Following 
that decision, the majority of political parties sought to 
solidify and maximise votes from their potential constitu-
encies by forming large electoral coalitions. However, as 
the civil war evolved, Sistani expressly forbade retaliation 
against the rising tide of sectarian violence, acting as a 
major break on organised sectarian retribution. It is Sis-
tani’s refusal, after the elections of 2005, to overtly engage 
in Iraqi politics that partly explains the fracturing of the 
political coalitions that have sought to use moral populism 
to mobilise Iraq’s Shiʿa.
Muqtada al-Sadr, from 2003 until 2007, became the main 
promoter of Shiʿa moral populism. His militia, the Mahdi 
Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi), a radical, violent and non-hierar-
chical organisation, was one of the major protagonists in 
the civil war. From mid-2006 onwards, Mahdi Army death 
squads used Sadr city and east Baghdad as a platform 
from which to attempt to drive Baghdad’s Sunni population 
out of the city altogether.
However, the shifting causes of moral populism in Iraq are 
reflected by Sadr’s ideational and organisational trans-
formation since 2007. In the face of clashes between the 
Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades, another Shiʿa militia, 
Sadr drastically reformed his militia, purging and shrinking 
its size to gain greater control. Then, following the popular 
protests of 2015, Sadr gave his wholesale backing to the 
movement, aligning with the Iraqi Communist Party and 
even deploying what was left of his militia to defend it. 
The national elections of 2018 mark the peak of Sadr’s 
turn away from moral populism towards issue-based 
politics. Sadr demobilised his old party and formed a new 
one, formally aligning it with the Iraqi Communist Party 
to create the Saairun Coalition. During the election, the 
resulting coalition overtly campaigned against the muhasa-
sa taʾifia system, calling for the creation of a technocratic 
government to reform Iraqi politics and fight party-driven 
political corruption. However, in the aftermath of the vote, 
Sadr quickly moved into negotiations to reconstitute the 
muhasasa taʾifia system he campaigned so vociferously 
3  Ibid.
4  Ali Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 341, 343, 390. 
against. This cannot but alienate his supporters and dele-
gitimise him as an agent of much needed political reform.
Another major political party seeking to mobilise the Shiʿa 
vote through moral populism was the ISCI. However, the 
ISCI were the main victims of the fragmentation of the 
Shiʿa political field. In the aftermath of the 2010 national 
elections, their armed wing, the Badr Brigades, formally 
split from the party because the ISCI’s leader, Ammar al-
Hakim, refused to back a second term for Nouri al-Malik. 
Then, in July 2017, Hakim himself finally left the party’s old 
guard to form a new organisation, the National Wisdom 
Movement. This was in recognition that ISCI’s previous 
alignment with Iran and use of overt sectarian rhetoric 
would now be a hindrance to Hakim’s aim of targeting the 
youth vote in the 2018 elections. This strategy resulted in 
the Wisdom Movement winning 19 seats.
The final party seeking to mobilise the Shiʿa vote is the 
Islamic Daʿwa Party. This party has supplied three of Iraq’s 
four post-2003 prime ministers, Ibrahim al-Jafaari, Nouri 
al-Maliki and Haider al-Abadi. Like its two political rivals, 
Daʿwa’s relationship to Shiʿa moral populism has fluctu-
ated. The promotion of an exclusivist moral populism 
reached its peak under Nouri al-Maliki’s two terms (2006–
14). Maliki centralised power in the prime minister’s office 
as he attempted to outflank a highly factionalised cabinet. 
He also came to dominate a previously highly plural polit-
ical marketplace. However, he was unable to rebuild the 
state’s institutional capacity to deliver services to the pop-
ulation. Against this background, when faced with a weak 
and highly corrupt state and hence an alienated population, 
he mobilised the backing of Shiʿa voters by utilising overtly 
sectarian language, demonising the Sunni sections of Iraqi 
society, first as Baʿathists and then as jihadi terrorists.
This destructive moral populism reached a peak when 
Maliki used accusations of terrorism to drive Sunni Vice 
President Tariq al-Hashimi and Minister of Finance, Rafi 
al-Issawi, out of government and then into exile. The perse-
cution of Issawi in December 2012 triggered mass demon-
strations across the Sunni-majority areas of the northwest 
and further increased a general sense of alienation that 
allowed Daʿesh to expand so rapidly.
Maliki was removed as Prime Minister in 2014, despite 
gaining the largest personal vote in those elections. He was 
replaced by another member of Daʿwa’s national politburo, 
Haider al-Abadi. From his prime ministerial acceptance 
speech in September 2014, Abadi made it clear that he rec-
ognised the damage Maliki’s sectarian rhetoric had done 
and highlighted his aim to sweep away the muhasasa taʾifia 
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system through ‘a comprehensive revolution, based on new 
administrative foundations’.
In the 2018 elections, the Daʿwa Party, divided between 
Maliki and Abadi, could not agree on a united electoral 
slate, which led to them running two separate electoral 
coalitions. Although overall electoral campaigning focused 
on policy issues, particularly how to reduce corruption and 
reform the economy, Maliki’s State of Law Coalition contin-
ued to deploy moral populism in an attempt to garner votes 
amongst the Shiʿa population. Maliki himself and other 
candidates built their campaign around the notion of ‘Shiʿa 
oppression and marginalisation (muthloomiya)’. They re-
peatedly highlighted the danger posed by specifically Sunni 
insurgent groups linked to the Baʿath Party.5
The final and most recent vehicle for Shiʿa moral populism 
has been the formation of the Hashd al-Shaʿabi. In the af-
termath of the fall of Mosul, in June 2014, as Islamic State 
forces were rapidly moving southwards towards Baghdad, 
Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani issued a religiously binding edict 
or fatwa, calling on all able-bodied men to defend ‘their 
country, their people and their holy places’. Tens of thou-
sands of young Shiʿa men joined the force that was created 
to fight against Daʿesh. Radically sectarian and violent Shiʿa 
militia groups like Asaʾib Ahl al-Haq, Kataʾib Hezbollah and 
the Badr Brigades, took centre stage, arming and deploying 
these new recruits and, in the process, rapidly expanding 
in size, power and influence. It was their electoral vehicle, 
the Fateh Alliance, which won 48 seats, the second largest, 
under the leadership of Hadi al-Ameri.
The fracturing of the electoral coalition that sought to max-
imise the Shiʿa vote on the basis of moral populism in the 
2010 electoral campaign, the selection of Haider al-Abadi 
as Prime Minister in September 2014 and the recapture of 
Mosul from Daʿesh in July 2017 all combined to create a 
window of opportunity for those seeking to mobilise the 
Shiʿa vote. 
One of CRP–Iraq’s research projects will examine the 
future role of the Hashd al-Shaʿabi, studying government 
attempts to gain control over their budget, integrate them 
into the wider chain of command, and then reduce their 
size by widespread demobilisation.
Overall, the fracturing of the ‘Shiʿa house’, the large electoral 
bloc personified by the United Iraqi Alliance, lends Iraqi poli-
tics a much more fluid nature. The plausible decline in mor-
5  Renad Mansour and Christine van den Toorn, ‘The 2018 Iraqi Fed-
eral Elections: A Population in Transition?’, Institute of Regional and 
International Studies and LSE Middle East Centre Report (2018), p. 17. 
al populism allows greater space for the encouragement 
of issue-based politics. It also allows for the formation of 
post-election policy implementation coalitions within gov-
ernment, which could push for the meaningful reform of 
the muhasasa taʾifia system, moving the Iraqi political field 
away from identity-based politics towards service delivery.
Sunni Moral Populism
Lacking the centralised religious hierarchy of Shiʿa Islam or 
the dominant political parties of Kurdish politics, the use of 
a specific Sunni moral populism is more difficult to assess. 
It can be argued that a specifically Sunni moral populism 
was late to arise in Iraq.
In the immediate aftermath of regime change, the dom-
inant rhetoric and symbolism used by those seeking to 
mobilise Sunni Iraqis tended to focus not on them as 
Sunnis but instead as Iraqi nationalists or patriots resist-
ing a foreign invader. It was not until the midst of the civil 
war and the rise of an overtly transnational radical jihadi 
Salafism that political entrepreneurs specifically addressed 
those they wanted to mobilise as Iraqi Sunnis, setting them 
against Shiʿa and Kurds.6
The alienation and anger felt amongst Iraq’s Sunnis coa-
lesced for a time around a loose coalition of mosques, the 
Association of Muslim Scholars (Hayʾat al-Ulama al-Mus-
limin, AMS).7 Beyond the more guarded moral populism of 
the AMS stood radical jihadist Salafism. The violent opposi-
tion to the US occupation and the new order it established 
started to cohere into more compact fighting groups in 
2005. What united these groups was an increasing com-
mitment to jihadist Salafism and an aggressive sectarian 
moral populism.8 Taking the lead in this amalgamation was 
Jordanian jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who by 2004 had 
allied his own group in Iraq with al-Qaeda. However, this al-
liance was continuously put under strain, primarily because 
of Zarqawi’s extreme anti-Shiʿa sectarianism.9 After Zarqa-
wi’s death in 2006, the organisation further expanded and 
6  R Meijer, ‘Sunni Factions and the “Political Process”’, in David M. 
Malone, Markus E. Bouillon and Ben Rowswell (eds), Iraq: Preventing 
a New Generation of Conflict (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 
2007), pp. 89–108.
7  Nir Rosen, Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America’s Wars in 
the Muslim World (New York: Nation Books, 2010), p.38.
8  ‘In their own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency’, International 
Crisis Group Middle East Report 50, 15 February 2006. Available at: 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabi-
an-peninsula/iraq/their-own-words-reading-iraqi-insurgency.
9  Andrew Phillips, ‘How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq’, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 63/1 (2009), pp. 64–84.
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transformed into Daʿesh, a radical Sunni jihadi organisation 
designed to capitalise on an increasingly sectarian conflict 
and bearing the hallmarks of that war’s brutality.10
From 2003 onwards, the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) was given 
the role of representing the Sunni population within the 
muhasasa taʾifia system, the Iraqi Governing Council and 
every government of national unity since. To do this, the 
IIP set up Tawafuq, a broader electoral coalition. However, 
as violence temporarily declined after 2007 and with it the 
assertion of aggressive sectarian politics, the IIP suffered 
from a split similar to those parties deploying moral pop-
ulism to rally the Shiʿa vote. This dynamic came to a head 
in 2008, when a number of prominent personalities left the 
coalition.
In the run up to the 2010 national elections, Ayad Allawi, 
leader of Iraqi National List (Wifaq), set out to capitalise 
on the decline in sectarian politics, which allowed him the 
freedom to build a much broader organisation to fight the 
national elections. Its attainment of 91 seats, compared to 
89 for the Prime Minister’s State of Law Coalition and 70 
for the Iraqi National Alliance, is to date the strongest elec-
toral showing for a party not deploying moral populism in 
their election campaign. However, the 2014 elections saw 
Allawi’s previous alliance, Iraqiyya, fracture. This signaled a 
return to Sunni moral populism.
In the 2018 elections those electoral coalitions seeking to 
capture a specifically Sunni vote suffered most from the 
fracturing of ethno-sectarian voting bloc. Osama al-Nujaifi’s 
Iraqi Decision Alliance (Tahaluf al-Qarar al-Iraqi) set out to 
mobilise the electorate using an exclusive Sunni-centric 
moral populism. However, with the major national blocs 
also campaigning in Sunni majority areas, Nujaifi’s strategy 
failed and he only managed to get 14 seats, a reduction of 
9 from 2014.11
One of the CRP’s central research projects will examine 
the future trends in Sunni political mobilisation, the role of 
internally displaced populations and the possible political 
role of recently returned former IDPs. This research will 
focus on political trends within Iraq’s Sunni population but 
also allow policy interventions to target resources that will 
help bolster meaningful political representation, creating 
channels for democratic mobilisation at both provincial 
and national levels.
10  Cole Bunzel, ‘From Paper State to Caliphate, the Ideology of the 
Islamic State’, Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic 
World, March 2015. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
research/files/papers/2015/03/ideology-of-islamic-state-bunzel/
the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state.pdf.
11  ‘Iraq Votes 2018’.
Moral Populism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Kurdish nationalism in Iraq emerged in response to the 
excesses of Arab nationalism towards Kurds. Iraq’s defeat 
in the Gulf War of 1991 brought Kurdish aspirations of an 
independent homeland closer by establishing the KRG, a 
semi-autonomous government later recognised by Iraq’s 
2005 Constitution.
The Kurdish nationalist project and an associated moral 
populism entered a new era after 2003. Transnational net-
works connected the Kurdish diaspora with Iraqi Kurds and 
prompted greater ideological diversity. At the same time, 
opposition to the KRG and its traditional party establish-
ment emerged, especially amongst the young generation.12 
The Gorran Movement (Movement for Change) fragmented 
the two-party structure of the KRG, challenged endemic 
corruption and nepotism, and undermined the KRG’s na-
tionalist narrative that hinged upon Kurdish independence 
and self-determination.13
The Gorran Movement also amplified the voices of two 
Kurdish Islamist parties, capitalising on their disillusion-
ment with the ruling KDP and PUK establishment.14 Howev-
er, while these Islamist parties demonstrate the existence 
of Islamist moral populism in the KRI, political Islam and 
sectarian identity politics are nowhere near as influential 
here as they are in central and southern Iraq.15 Equally, 
while it is true that Daʿesh has managed to recruit hundreds 
of Kurds since 2014, some of whom launched attacks in 
Erbil, Kirkuk and internationally,16 research suggests that 
Daʿesh recruitment strategies exploited popular grievances 
with rampant corruption, economic disenfranchisement, 
12  Denise Natali, ‘Are the Kurds Still Kingmakers in Iraq?’, Carnegie 
Endowment, 26 May 2010. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.
org/sada/?fa=40856l; Denise Natali, Kurdish Quasi-State: Develop-
ment and Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 2010).
13  Akiko Yoshioka, ‘The Shifting Balance of Power in Iraqi Kurdistan: 
The Struggle for Democracy with Uninstitutionalized Governance’, 
International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 9/1 (March 2015), 
pp. 21–35.
14  Kawa Hassan, ‘Kurdistan’s Politicized Society Confronts a Sultanis-
tic System’, Carnegie Middle East Centre (2015). Available at: https://
carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_54_Hassan_11.pdf. 
15  Michiel Leezenberg, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan: Contours of a Post-Civil War 
Society’, Third World Quarterly 26/4 (2015), pp. 631–47; Michiel 
Leezenberg, ‘Politics, Economy, and Ideology in Iraqi Kurdistan since 
2003: Enduring Trends and Novel Challenges’, Arab Studies Journal 
23/1 (2015), p. 154.
16  ‘Youth between Two Options: Migration and Joining Extremist 
Group’, Global Shapers Community, 4 October 2015. Available at: 
https://www.globalshapers.org/news/youth-between-two-options-mi-
gration-and-joining-extremist-groups.
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financial instability and poor education in the region.17
Nationalist sentiment has also been exploited in the 
recruitment strategies of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK), a radical pan-Kurdish movement open to both men 
and women that has engaged in combat against Daʿesh. 
The PKK’s success on the battlefront, combined with the 
increasing popular rejection of corruption and nepotism of 
the two leading Kurdish parties, has increased its popular-
ity and support. From the perspective of many Iraqi Kurds, 
the KDP and PUK deployed Kurdish moral populism for 
their own political and commercial leverage, thus compro-
mising nationalism, while the PKK ‘preserved its nationalist 
profile’ and hence its legitimacy.18
Kurdish moral populism and nationalism have shifted over 
the past decade as a result of the failure of the Kurdish 
ruling elite to secure economic and political stability and 
prosperity for the Kurdish people. Many Kurds now place 
the importance of obtaining a job or education above 
achieving independence. This sentiment was amplified 
over 2017–18, with KRG territorial losses and a decline in 
the economic and political rights and privileges Kurds had 
gained from Baghdad. 
The KRG’s most significant attempt at amplifying its moral 
populism came on 25 September 2017, when it held a 
referendum on Kurdish independence against the wishes 
of Baghdad and its neighbours, with 93 percent voting in 
favour. Masoud Barzani and the KDP sought to use the  
referendum to exacerbate Kurdish moral populism and 
shore up their legitimacy, but the significant territorial, 
economic and political losses that followed the vote 
undermined this attempt, and highlighted the fact that 
nationalist sentiment was more a reflection of the crises 
in and around Iraq rather than steady progress towards a 
Kurdish state.
The retaking of Kirkuk by federal forces in October 2017 
further alienated voters from the establishment leadership, 
particularly the PUK, whom many viewed as having be-
trayed the Kurdish cause by negotiating a deal with Bagh-
dad to withdraw from the city. The ongoing protests that 
flared into mass movements in December 2017 and March 
2018, the harnessing of anti-corruption and anti-establish-
ment narratives by newly-formed political parties, and the 
boycotting of the Kurdish independence referendum and 
17  Denise Natali, ‘Islamic State Infiltrates Iraqi Kurdistan’, Al-Monitor, 
4 June 2015. Available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origi-
nals/2015/06/is-infiltration-iraqi-kurdistan.html.
18  Jon Gorvett, ‘PKK Popularity Grows in Iraq’s Autonomous Kurd-
istan Region’, The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 26/5 
(2007), pp. 30–31.
Iraqi federal elections, similarly reflected growing disillu-
sionment. Despite the continued use of moral populism 
by both establishment and opposition parties, the general 
shift away from oft-used nationalist narratives reflects the 
disenfranchisement Kurds felt towards their leadership. 
The protest movement in particular reflected the griev-
ances of civil servants, teachers and the general public 
towards officials whose attempts at stoking nationalist 
fervour, they believed, could no longer justify their stay in 
power. Although grievances had been ongoing since the 
consolidation and expansion of power by the PUK–KDP du-
opoly, they flared into protests and violence, most recently 
in the aftermath of the Kurdish independence referendum 
in 2017 and lead-up to the Iraqi federal elections in May 
2018. 
The strength of the protest movement prompted the 
emergence of the Coalition for Democracy and Justice 
(CDJ), whose leader, former Kurdish Prime Minister Bar-
ham Salih split from the PUK in September 2017, and the 
New Generation Movement, led by Shaswar Abdulwahid, 
owner of Nalia Media Corporation. Both parties joined 
the ranks of existing opposition parties. While personal 
attacks and anti-Baghdad rhetoric reigned supreme in the 
campaigns of the PUK and KDP, these new parties shifted 
their priorities away from ethno-centric Kurdish nationalist 
narratives towards ones that focused on ending corruption, 
restoring good governance, and securing salaries for civil 
servants. They subsequently joined forces in the aftermath 
of the election to protest electoral fraud and demand a vote 
recount. 
Changes in the way moral populism is communicated also 
reflect general attitudes towards the Kurdish referendum 
and the 2018 elections, where boycotts and abstentions 
were common.19 Public and private protests about the 
timing of the referendum also indicated that Kurdish 
nationalist sentiment could not be rallied on the basis of 
ethno-centric narratives and historical territorial claims 
alone. Nevertheless, turnout was high and 93 percent voted 
in favour of independence. The referendum indicated that, 
in the final hours before the vote, these narratives were still 
strong enough to sway the general public to vote, despite 
the clear instrumental motives of the ruling party.20
19  Christine van den Toorn, ‘Internal Divides behind the Kurdistan Ref-
erendum’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11 October 
2017. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/73359.
20  ‘Primary Results’, The Independent High Elections and Referendum 
Commission, 27 September 2017. Available at: http://www.khec.krd/
pdf/173082892017_english%202.pdf.
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The 2018 federal elections were even clearer indicators of 
this shift in both campaign narratives and efforts to boy-
cott and abstain. In all provinces with significant Kurdish 
populations (with the exception of Ninewa), turnout was 
significantly lower (close to 40 percent) than in both the 
2010 and 2014 elections (at around 70 percent).21 However, 
as with the referendum, establishment parties demon-
strated their continued hold on power, as the low turnout 
benefitted the KDP and PUK, who gained 25 and 18 seats 
respectively. Gorran came in a distant third, winning only 
5 seats, 4 fewer than in the previous election; while New 
Generation received 4; and the CDJ, 2. 
Across the KRI, the apparently monolithic ethno-sectarian 
blocs which dominated Iraqi politics from regime change 
until 2010 have all but disappeared. Moral populism 
remains a key political strategy but those organisations de-
ploying it have become more numerous and have to refer 
to other issues like corruption and the lack of government 
services. Politics are hence more fluid, but moral populism 
still remains the lowest common denominator that politi-
cians who have failed to deliver meaningful change to their 
constituents deploy to gain votes.
CRP research on moral populism in Iraq will allow a wider 
understanding of the countervailing forces within the 
KRG after the referendum and the loss of Kirkuk. Today, 
the senior leadership of the KDP and PUK are in disarray, 
unable to shape meaningful policies that will allow them to 
respond to the financial crisis they face or move towards 
sustainable diplomatic relations with Baghdad. This 
research will give a much better understanding of political 
dynamics within the KRG, how these are influencing – or 
not – Kurdish political elites and what this means for long 
term stability.
The Political Marketplace
The Political Marketplace and the GoI
The political marketplace refers to transactional politics 
that facilitate the purchase of political loyalties in exchange 
for material reward, often extracted from state resources. 
This is an updated form of patrimonial politics, which com-
petes with and undermines processes of state-building and 
institutional development. In Iraq, the functioning of the 
political marketplace is intimately linked to and legitimised 
by the use of ethno-sectarian moral populism to justify 
both the position of the ruling elite and their division of 
the spoils of government amongst themselves and their 
21  Mansour and Van den Toorn, ‘The 2018 Iraqi Federal Elections’.
followers. The post-2003 political settlement which has 
shaped the process of government formation following 
all five of Iraq’s national elections is best understood as a 
rough and ready variant of consociationalism, an exclusive 
elite pact justified in terms of sectarian apportionment, or 
muhasasa taʾifia.
The political settlement created by the US after the inva-
sion was an exclusive elite pact that placed the workings 
of the political marketplace at the centre of the state. 
This elite pact was then institutionalised by the 2005 
Constitution, and legitimised by the terms under which 
post-election governments have been formed since. It also 
deliberately marginalised the political role and hence the 
resources available to representatives of one section of 
Iraq’s population, the Sunnis. The dual outcomes of the mu-
hasasa taʾifia system have been debilitating corruption and 
constant resentment from all those excluded from access 
to the spoils of office.
Within the muhasasa taʾifia system, the political market-
place functions in three ways. First, the dominant parties 
use government payrolls to reward political loyalty. Second, 
they use government contracts to enrich business people 
close to their leaderships. Third, money is simply stolen 
from the ministerial budgets for both personal gain and 
party use.
After each national election, the muhasasa taʾifia system 
sees ministries and their resources awarded to ethno-sec-
tarian parties as a reward for taking part in governments 
of national unity. Each party then exploits the resources of 
the ministry they have been awarded for political, but also 
very often personal, gain. Parties issue a tazkiya, or letter of 
recommendation, to their followers that allows them to get 
jobs in the ministries they control.22 As a result, ministerial 
payrolls are expanded to employ party members as well as 
those connected to party bosses. This has led to a state 
payroll that has swelled from between 850,000 and 1.2 mil-
lion employees in 2003 to a peak of 3 million in 2015. The 
public sector wages bill between 2005 and 2010 amounted 
to 31 percent of the total expenditure of government, or 18 
percent of GDP.23
22  Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation 
and its Legacy (London: Hurst & Company, 2006). 
23  Ali Al-Mawlawi, ‘Analysing Growth Trends in Public Sector Employ-
ment in Iraq’, LSE Middle East Centre Blog, 31 July 2018. Available at: 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/07/31/analysing-growth-trends-in-
public-sector-employment-in-iraq/; Ali Mamouri, ‘How to overcome 
Iraq’s economic crisis’, Al-Monitor, 9 February 2016. Available at: 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/iraq-econo-
my-crisis-solutions-promote-small-businesses.html; Tim Arango, 
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Major corruption scandals have dominated the Ministries 
of Defence, Oil, Electricity and Trade. Iraq’s widespread 
political corruption is supposedly fought by two major 
institutions specifically designed to reduce fraud within 
government. However, a leaked US Embassy report con-
cluded in 2007 that ‘Iraq is not capable of even rudimentary 
enforcement of anti-corruption laws’. There is little reason 
to suggest there has been any significant change in the 
situation since.
Our research project on the political market place and the 
GoI will examine the drivers of payroll expansion in two 
specific ministries, the composition of that payroll and 
how it can successfully be reduced. This will give unprec-
edented insight into the corruption that has undermined 
the coherence and legitimacy of the Iraqi state since 2003. 
This information will help the shaping and targeting of 
anti-corruption policies.
The Political Marketplace in the KRI
Since 2003, the KRG has operated as a rentier state 
through its reliance on oil revenue, extensive corruption, a 
huge public sector and a weak tax structure.24 By prior-
itising fast-track hydrocarbon development and using the 
‘oil card’ as leverage against Baghdad, the KRG bypassed 
necessary institution building that could have shielded it 
from the ill effects of rentierism.25 The major Kurdish politi-
cal parties have pursued loyalty and legitimacy through the 
‘Battered by War, Iraq Now Faces Calamity from Dropping Oil Prices’, 
New York Times, 31 January 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/02/01/world/middleeast/battered-by-war-iraq-now-fac-
es-calamity-from-dropping-oil-prices.html; Martin Chulov, ‘Post-War 
Iraq: “Everyone is Corrupt, from Top to Bottom, including me”’, The 
Guardian, 19 February 2016. Available at: http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2016/feb/19/post-war-iraq-corruption-oil-prices-reve-
nues; Loveday Morris, ‘Iraq is broke. Add that to its list of worries’, The 
Washington Post, 5 March 2016. Available at: http://wapo.st/1X-
0knsq?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.2e636ef9b08a. 
24  Mark DeWeaver, ‘Kurdistan’s Great Recession: From Boom to Bust 
in the Rentier Economy’, Institute of Regional and International Stud-
ies Report (2015). Available at: http://auis.edu.krd/iris/sites/default/
files/Kurdistan%27s%20Great%20Recession_1.pdf; Mark DeWeaver, 
‘Making Ends Meet: Economic Reforms in the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq’, Institute of Regional and International Studies (2015). Available 
at: www.auis.edu.krd/iris/sites/default/files/IIR_Making%20Ends%20
Meet_DeWeaver%202017.pdf; Michael Gunter, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan’s two 
Contrasting Economic Images’, International Journal of Contemporary 
Iraqi Studies 6 (2012), pp. 89–95; Erlend Paasche, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan: 
Partner Under Pressure’, Peace Research Institute Oslo Policy Brief 
4 (2014). Available at: https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publica-
tion/?x=7589. 
25  Natali, Kurdish Quasi-State.
distribution of government resources26 and have redistrib-
uted wealth through the public sector payroll, giving the 
KDP and PUK extensive control over the public sector.27
The KRG’s law enforcement and security institutions are 
also built upon patronage networks. The KDP and the PUK 
maintain their own Peshmerga units and provide them with 
incentives, including free housing, land, lucrative monthly 
salaries and generous pensions, thus enforcing the division 
of security actors across party lines.28 This personalised 
and clientelistic approach to power is one main reason 
behind the lack of progress in integrating and depoliticising 
the region’s different security forces.29
The oil sector provides the primary source of funding for 
the political marketplace. That it can do so speaks to the 
lack of transparency within the sector, brought about by 
non-existent or ineffective institutions and a paucity of 
compulsory public disclosure. The opacity in the manage-
ment of oil resources has not only fueled internal distrust 
of government, but also impeded the resolution of disputes 
with the central government. Even when the government 
itself tried to address the problem of corruption, it deliber-
ately omitted the Ministry of Natural Resources from its re-
forms.30 Overall, a lack of transparency and accountability 
has consistently been a barrier to democratic development 
in the KRI.31
26  Bilal Wahab, ‘Oil Federalism in Iraq: Resource Curse, Patronage 
Networks and Stability. Case Studies of Baghdad, Kurdistan and the 
Advent of ISIS’, George Mason University PhD Thesis (2015). Available 
at: http://mars.gmu.edu/handle/1920/9682; Kawa Jabary and Anil 
Hira, ‘The Kurdish Mirage: A Success Story in Doubt’, Middle East 
Policy 20/2 (2013), pp. 99–112; Yoshioka, ‘The Shifting Balance of 
Power in Iraqi Kurdistan’. 
27  Mario Fumerton and Wladimir van Wilgenburg, ‘Kurdistan’s Politi-
cal Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces’, Carne-
gie Endowment for International Peace, 16 December 2015. Available 
at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/12/16/kurdistan-s-politi-
cal-armies-challenge-of-unifying-peshmerga-forces-pub-61917. 
28  Mohammed M. A. Ahmed, Iraqi Kurds and nation-building (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012); Bilal Wahab, ‘Trouble Brewing in Ira-
qi Kurdistan’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 30 September 
2016. Available at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analy-
sis/view/trouble-brewing-in-iraqi-kurdistan.
29  Fumerton and Wladimir van Wilgenburg, ‘Kurdistan’s Political 
Armies’.
30  Muslih Irwani, Clientelism and Implementing Social Security 
Programmes in Post-Conflict Iraqi Kurdistan Region (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015).
31  Shwan Zulal, ‘Reforming Iraqi Kurdistan’s Oil Revenue’, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 21 December 2010. Available at: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/46306. 
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The Kurdish independence referendum and subsequent 
takeover of the disputed territories marked a turning point 
in Kurdish territorial control and administrative and eco-
nomic authority over the oil-rich territories. The reassertion 
of federal power over checkpoints, borders and airports 
further reduced the extent to which the KRG could maintain 
its patronage networks in security apparatuses, the public 
sector and private business. This expansion of federal au-
thority, paired with the March 2018 reduction in the federal 
budget for the KRG from 17 to 12.6 percent, significantly 
weakened the KRG’s ability to sustain its economy and 
social services, forcing a contraction of the KRG payroll.32
In particular, the retake of the Kirkuk oil fields, over which 
Kurdish forces asserted control in the fight against Daʿesh 
in 2014, constituted the most significant blow to the KRI 
economy. The Kirkuk oil fields provided about 70 percent 
of the KRG’s daily output of oil, and they – along with the 
other fields retaken by federal forces in October 2017 – 
provided about $8 billion of annual revenue for the KRG.33 
The Ministry of Natural Resources, widely considered to 
be one of the least transparent government institutions 
in the KRG, ostensibly tried to respond to criticisms from 
both Baghdad and foreign governments. In January 2018, 
it announced that Deloitte’s audit of KRG oil and gas 
sectors, which it asserted was ‘a transparent process and 
in accordance with the World Bank guidelines’34 found ‘no 
misstatements in KRG oil sales’.35 However, this report was 
immediately met with skepticism given its lack of detail 
and poor fulfilment of promised data.36 
The reduction of the KRG’s portion of the federal budget 
may, however, force more genuine efforts to reform and 
reduce the size of the public sector, especially if politicians 
32  ‘Iraq adopts 2018 budget, slashing allocations for Kurds’, Middle 
East Eye, 3 March 2018. Available at: https://www.middleeast-
eye.net/news/iraq-adopts-2018-budget-slashing-allocations-
kurds-1116415756.
33  David Zucchino, ‘Iraqi Forces Retake All Oil Fields in Disputed 
Areas as Kurds Retreat’, New York Times, 17 October 2017. Available 
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/world/middleeast/iraq-
kurds-kirkuk.html.
34  ‘Deloitte Report on Oil and Gas in the Kurdistan Region’, Kurdistan 
Regional Government, 16 January 2018. Available at: http://cabinet.
gov.krd/a/d.aspx?a=56305&l=12&s=040000.
35  ‘Deloitte found no ‘misstatements’ in KRG oil sales in first audit 
report’, RUDAW, 16 January 2018. Available at: http://www.rudaw.net/
english/business/16012018.
36  Patrick Osgood, ‘Selective Transparency: Things You Can’t See 
about KRG Oil’, LSE Middle East Centre Blog, 25 April 2018. Available 
at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/04/25/selective-transparency-
things-you-cant-see-about-krg-oil/.
want to address the grievances of an increasingly dis-
enfranchised public. The fact that the KRG must now be 
accountable to the government in Baghdad may incentivise 
it to address corruption more quickly than if it were able to 
rely entirely on the benefits of rentierism.
The research project focused on the political marketplace 
in the KRG will examine the scope and extent of patronage 
networks and the role they play in undermining government 
institutional coherence. It is hoped the findings will provide 
insights into the political economy of the KRG and help 
shape policy interventions aimed at encouraging reform.
Public Authority
Public Authority in Iraq
For the CRP, public authority refers to the structures and 
people who exercise governance functions, with a degree 
of consent, at any level above the family. Public authorities 
are the units of governance as they actually exist in any 
particular situation. In Iraq, centralised public authority, 
the civil and military institutions of the state, have been 
transformed three times. Under Baʿathist rule during the 
1970s, the significant increase in oil revenues allowed the 
regime to greatly expand its institutional presence within 
society. However, following the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, 
thirteen years of the harshest international sanctions ever 
imposed on Iraq led to a retrenchment of state institutions. 
The violent aftermath of the 2003 invasion led to another 
dramatic decline in institutional capacity to the point where 
Iraq could be described as a failed state. Between 2007 
and 2014, buoyed up by strong oil prices, state institutions 
slowly re-established themselves within Iraqi society. How-
ever, Daʿesh’s campaign against the Iraqi state, culminating 
in the fall of Mosul in 2014, dealt another major blow to 
centralised public authority.
After 2003, as centralised public authority declined, sub-
state organisations partially filled the gap left by the state. 
Many of these were either religious institutions, most 
prominently the institutions of the Shiʿa religious hierarchy, 
or used a religiously-based moral populism to justify their 
governance function within society. Muqtada al-Sadr’s 
Mahdi Army is a prime as example of this, as was the 
governance role that Daʿesh took on in the territory it con-
trolled. A central part of this struggle between the societal 
role of state institutions and their non-state competitors 
will be the future role of the numerous groups that make up 
the Hashd al-Shaʿabi, especially in the south of the country.
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Attempts at federal decentralisation, heralded by the pass-
ing of Law 21 by the Iraqi Parliament in 2008 and backed 
by the international community, are designed to push 
provincial government institutions into the space vacat-
ed by weak national governance. However, it is clear this 
policy initiative has been contested at a national level with 
ministers, ministries and director generals all attempting to 
hinder the delegation of power to the provincial level. The 
concept also remains unpopular with the Iraqi population.
CRP–Iraq’s research project on GoI public authority will 
examine the motivations behind attempts to block decen-
tralisation and the success of initiatives to build capacity 
at the provincial level. This research project will allow for 
an assessment of this policy initiative’s success and help 
shape similarly targeted interventions in the future.
The Iraqi Armed Forces and the Fall of Mosul
The US military, after initially disbanding the Iraqi armed 
forces in 2003, changed its mind in 2004. By 2011, $24.49 
billion had been spent in an attempt to rebuild it.37 When 
the US withdrew from Iraq in December 2011 there were 
940,000 people working for the security forces. The quality 
of rank and file soldiers and the weaknesses in the com-
mand and control of the armed forces raised doubts about 
the military’s ability to function after the US drawdown. An-
other serious problem was the politicisation of the officer 
corps after 2003.
The majority of the Iraqi forces, carefully constructed 
over seven years, collapsed in the face of Daʿesh’s 2014 
campaign.38 The Iraqi Minister of Defence from 2014 to 
2016, Khaled al-Obaidi, estimated that 60–70 percent of 
the Iraqi armed forces left government employment after 
June 2014.39 Against this background, the vast majority of 
the Iraqi army involved in the fight against Daʿesh had to be 
rebuilt almost from scratch.
37  Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Iraqi Force Development in 2007’, Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (2007), p. 8. Available at: http://
csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070823_iraqi_force_development.
pdf; ‘Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States 
Congress’, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (July 
2011), p.70. Available at: http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/
July2011/Report_-_July_2011.pdf.
38  Mitchell Prothero, ‘Iraqi Army Remains on Defensive as Extent 
of June Debacle Becomes Clearer’, McClatchy News, 14 July 2014. 
Available at: https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/
world/article24770476.html.
39  PressTV, Full Interview with Khaled al-Obaidi (Iraq’s Defense Minis-
ter), YouTube, 5 August 2016. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=V3d.Oqe.ldzY4.
In the face of such a complete collapse of the Iraqi army, 
then-Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, deployed a two-
pronged strategy to reform and rebuild it. First, he set 
about purging its senior ranks of corrupt or politically 
tainted officers. Secondly, Abadi sought to tackle head-on 
the corruption that had become endemic throughout the 
country’s security forces. He did this by authorising an 
audit of the army’s payroll to identify ‘ghost soldiers’, indi-
viduals who are paid by the Ministry of Defence but do not 
actually show up for work, splitting their wages with senior 
military officers who authorise the deception. This payroll 
audit uncovered 50,000 individual cases of such fraud.40
Today, the Ministries of Interior and Defence combined are 
estimated to employ 875,253 people, with the work force of 
the Ministry of Interior falling by 12 percent since 2015 and 
Defence by 20 percent. This has been accompanied, be-
tween 2017–18, by a reduction in spending of 6.5 percent 
in Interior and 15 percent in Defence.41
As the liberation of Mosul indicates, rebuilding Iraq’s armed 
forces, along with the addition of the Hashd al-Shaʿabi 
forces and coalition airpower, created a formidable fight-
ing force. However, the Iraqi government now faces the 
daunting task of integrating the Hashd al-Shaʿabi into the 
mainstream fighting force and moving the whole of the 
state’s armed forces to a peacetime setting.
In addition to examining how the government is attempting 
to reduce the size of the Hashd al-Shaʿabi and integrate it 
into the mainstream military forces, another research pro-
ject will examine the post-Mosul relationship between the 
Counter Terrorism Service, the regular army and the forces 
controlled by the Ministry of Interior, assessing plans to 
bring greater coherence to overall command and control. 
Public Authority in the KRI
In the KRI, public authority is still defined by party, tribe and 
family networks. Public institutions, including ministries 
and the parliament, operate as fiefdoms divided between 
the KDP (and the Barzani family) and the PUK (and the 
Talabani family). Informal systems rather than formal rules 
and legal institutions shape governance and the ways in 
which power holders and social groups perceive their  
40  Alexander Smith, ‘Not Fighting ISIS: How Iraq’s 50,000 ‘Ghost 
Soldiers’ Run Their Scam’, NBC News, 28 December 2014. Available 
at: http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/not-fighting-isis-
how-iraqs-50-000-ghost-soldiers-run-n267261.
41  Al-Mawlawi, ‘Analysing Growth Trends in Public Sector Employ-
ment in Iraq’.
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interests.42 In such a context, the rivalry between the KDP 
and PUK renders the government a vehicle for patronage 
rather than a pursuer of collective and public interests.43
The reassertion of federal authority over the KRG follow-
ing the referendum in September 2017 has led some to 
challenge the authority of political elites in the region due 
to their failure to maintain Kurdish autonomy, power, rights 
and territories.44 For example, in response to the losses suf-
fered by the KRG in the wake of the referendum, Masoud 
Barzani, who had unilaterally and unlawfully extended his 
presidential term twice (in 2013 and 2015) stepped down.45 
Protests, low election turnout and the proliferation of new 
opposition parties also point to the emergence of new 
types of political authority. 
However, the behaviour of the traditional ruling elites during 
the protests in December 2017 and March 2018 shows 
that they are willing to use violence and fraud to maintain 
their authority. The 2017 independence referendum also 
exposed deep divisions within the KRG political elite. It 
amplified an existing pattern whereby political and personal 
interests drive decision-making at the expense of pluralism 
and the rule of law.46 While still ‘in the making’, there is a 
shift among certain segments about the perception of 
42  Anne Hagood, ‘The Peshmergas and the Future of the State’, 
NORIA Research, 21 January 2015. Available at: https://www.noria-re-
search.com/the-peshmergas-and-the-future-of-the-state/.
43  Jabary and Hira, ‘The Kurdish Mirage’.
44  Elise Knutsen, ‘What’s at Stake in Kurdistan’s Post-Referendum 
Future?’, New America, 28 September 2017. Available at: https://
www.newamerica.org/weekly/edition-178/whats-stake-kurdis-
tans-post-referendum-future/; Loveday Morris, ‘How the Kurdish 
independence referendum backfired spectacularly’, The Washington 
Post, 20 October 2017. Available at: http://wapo.st/2ippR7m?tid=ss_
tw&utm_term=.d2794054216e; Christine van den Toorn, ‘Internal 
Divides behind the Kurdistan Referendum’, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 11 October 2017. Available at: http://carnegieen-
dowment.org/sada/73359.
45  Isabel Coles and Ali Nabhan, ‘Iraqi Kurdish President Steps Down 
After Independence Push Backfires’, Wall Street Journal, 29 October 
2017. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqi-kurd-leader-to-
step-down-as-president-following-independence-vote-1509279415; 
Jane Arraf, ‘Iraqi Army: Almost One-quarter Lacks Minimum Quali-
fications’, The Christian Science Monitor, 22 May 2009. Available at: 
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0522/p06s07-
wome.html; Jane Arraf, ‘In Disputed Iraqi Territory, Rebuilding A City 
Means Doing It Yourself’, NPR, 11 January 2017. Available at: http://
www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/01/11/509265909/in-disput-
ed-iraqi-territory-rebuilding-a-city-means-doing-it-yourself.
46  Christine van den Toorn and Raad Alkadiri, ‘Kurdistan’s Missed 
Chance for Reform’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
15 September 2015. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/
sada/61286.
public authority. While the KDP and PUK maintain their 
authority through the same traditional means of tribe and 
family, their constituencies have shrunk over the past 
decade. Parties like Gorran, CDJ and New Generation seek 
authority through focusing on jobs, private sector growth 
and good governance.47 
The KRG’s relationship with the GoI is characterised by 
deep mistrust and a maximalist, zero-sum approach.48 
The main drivers of conflict associated with this relation-
ship are the disputed territories, revenue sharing, control 
of resources and the integration of the Peshmerga.49 The 
battle over oil and resources underscores that despite 
resource wealth, inadequate governance and institutional 
frameworks in both the KRG and GoI have failed to deliver 
economic benefits to the Iraqi people.50 
The absence of an agreed legal framework for the petrole-
um sector can, in part, be blamed upon the KRG’s lead-
ership within the federal government who have rejected 
negotiations over all the three revisions of the federal Oil 
and Gas Law.51
The 2017 independence referendum reversed 15 years of 
steady incline in Kurdish autonomy by resetting GoI–KRG 
relations and catalysing federal reassertion of authority. 
Civicness
‘Civicness’ in Iraq
Iraq suffered 35 years of one of the most repressive and 
violent dictatorships in the Middle East that went out of 
its way to atomise society and tie individuals directly to 
47  Mansour and Van den Toorn, ‘The 2018 Iraqi Federal Elections’; 
Van den Toorn, ‘Kurdistan Politics at a Crossroads’; ‘Iraq Votes 2018’.
48  Saad Naji Jawad, ‘The Kurdish Question in Iraq: Historical 
Background and Future Settlement’, Contemporary Arab Affairs 1/ 1 
(2008), pp. 25–41.
49  ‘Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble along the Trigger Line’, International 
Crisis Group Middle East Report 88, 8 July 2009, p. 8. Available at: 
http://www.aina.org/reports/iatktattl.pdf; ‘Iraq’s New Battlefront: The 
Struggle Over Ninewa’, International Crisis Group Middle East Report 
90, 28 September 2009, p. 8. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.
org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/iraq-s-
new-battlefront-struggle-over-ninewa; Seane Kane, ‘Iraq’s Disputed 
Territories: A View of the Political Horizon and Implications for US 
Policy’, US Institute of Peace Peaceworks 69 (2011); Peter Bartu, 
‘Wrestling with the Integrity of a Nation: The Disputed Internal Bound-
aries in Iraq’, International Affairs 86 (November 2010), pp. 1329–43.
50  Peter D Cameron, ‘Contracts and Constitutions: The Kurdish Factor 
in the Development of Oil in Iraq’, International Journal of Contempo-
rary Iraqi Studies, 5/1 (2011), pp. 81–99.
51  Ibid.
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the state.52 After regime change, Iraq’s polity was then 
transformed by an increasingly violent moral populism that 
deliberately divided the population amongst mutually exclu-
sive ethno-sectarian groups. The country later descended 
into a civil war in 2004 that lasted until 2008. Finally, during 
his premiership, Nouri al-Maliki used the state’s security 
services to pursue an increasingly authoritarian agenda 
aimed at coercively silencing his critics. In spite of this 
legacy of violence, moral populism and authoritarianism, 
Iraq remains an imperfect democracy with a vibrant civil 
society and a number of press outlets. However, ‘civicness’ 
operates within the constraints imposed by the political 
parties who, since 2003, obtained dominance. These 
parties deploy an aggressive moral populism designed to 
fracture civic mobilisation. Where this fails, they frequently 
use violent intimidation, delivered by both the state and 
party militias to curtail popular protest against them.
In the aftermath of regime change in 2003, Iraq’s media and 
civil society rapidly expanded into the space vacated by the 
former regime. In 2010, the Iraqi government attempted 
to regulate civil society groups through legislation. The 
drafting of the law and its passing through Parliament was 
accompanied by high levels of public scrutiny but was 
seen as a victory for the non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) involved. However, civil society groups still com-
plain about the length and bureaucratic process involved in 
registering with the government. In 2015, this process was 
further complicated by new requirements for NGOs to be 
first cleared by the de-Baʿathification Commission. Despite 
these hurdles, by 2015, 2,600 NGOs had fulfilled the require-
ments to register.53 However, the vast majority of these 
were arms of the dominant political parties set up to crowd 
out independent NGOs or exploit funding opportunities.
Beyond a party and electoral system that has been 
dominated by ethno-sectarian moral populism, cross-com-
munal political mobilisation has tended to focus on the 
government’s appalling record of service delivery and its 
relationship to the political marketplace and the muhasasa 
taʾifia system.
Before 2015, demonstrations focused on corruption and 
poor service delivery tended to be sporadic and largely 
reactive, targeted at the government’s inability to deliver 
electricity during the very hot summer months.54  
52  Isam Al‐Khafaji, ‘The Myth of Iraqi Exceptionalism’, Middle East 
Policy 7/4 (2000), pp. 62–86.
53  ‘Freedom in the World 2016: Iraq’, Freedom House. Available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/iraq.
54  Michael Schmidt and Duraid Adnan, ‘Protests Spread to more Iraqi 
Cities’, New York Times, 17 February 2011. Available at: http://www.
However, the mass demonstrations of 2015 focused on 
calls for a ‘civic state’.55
These demands were also of political significance because 
the vast majority of demonstrators in Baghdad and across 
the south were Shiʿa. Unlike previous summers, however, 
two important religious and political figures, Grand Ayatol-
lah Ali al-Sistani and Muqtada al-Sadr, gave their whole-
hearted support to the protest movements.56 When faced 
with mass protests backed by both Sistani and Sadr, Abadi 
had little choice but to try and meet their demands, launch-
ing an ambitious 44-point reform plan designed to end the 
sectarian muhasasa system, tackle corruption, reduce the 
size of government and reform the cabinet. However, as 
protestors demobilised and summer temperatures abated, 
Abadi’s reform plans remained unimplemented and Iraq 
saw a return to politics as usual.
The popular protests show the potential for cross-com-
munal civic mobilisation in Iraq. This might potentially 
serve as another avenue for women to participate in social, 
economic and political life, as sectarian mobilisation is 
highly patriarchal and leaves little room for women’s ability 
to influence political processes. However, these protests 
were ultimately unsuccessful for two reasons. Firstly, the 
demonstrators did not have the organisational capacity 
to sustain the movement on their own, which left them 
vulnerable to co-optation. Secondly, both the overt coer-
cive forces of the state and the militias of the dominant 
political parties used violence in an attempt to demobilise 
the movement. Again, it was Sadr’s forces who stepped 
forward to offer protection. 
If the protest movement is to grow into a sustainable 
political movement for change, then it will have to develop 
its own organisational capacity that separates it from the 
problematic association with Sadr. Isam al-Khafaji, veteran 
analyst of Iraqi politics, makes the point that the political 
movement that came out of the 2015 protest movement, 
the Takaddum Coalition, could have been the platform from 
which to launch an alternative programme to challenge the 
muhasasa system during the elections of 2018.57  
nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18iraq.html.
55  Faleh Abdul Jabar, ‘The Iraqi Protest Movement: From Identity 
Politics to Issue Politics’, LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series 25 
(2018). Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88294/1/Faleh_Iraqi%20
Protest%20Movement_Published_English.pdf.
56  Adnan Abu Zeed, ‘How religious movements gained the upper 
hand in Iraqi protests’, Al-Monitor, 8 April 2016. Available at: http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/iraq-secular-protests-
muqtada-al-sadr-reform-sit-ins.html.
57  Isam Al-Khafaji, ‘Iraq 2018 Elections: Between Sectarianism and 
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However, the organisational and ideological core of Takad-
dum, the Iraqi Communist Party, was co-opted into Sadr’s 
Saairun Coalition, thus removing its ability to channel 
societal anger into a focused political movement with a 
coherent reform agenda.
Civic Mobilisation in the KRI
Since 2003, as the KRG has gradually consolidated its 
central authority, the civil society organisations (CSOs) that 
have been able to operate successfully have usually been 
affiliated to either the KDP or the PUK.58 This has limited 
the effectiveness of CSOs, and explains, in part, why the 
KRG is still struggling with basic issues of human rights, 
freedom of speech, minority rights, fiscal transparency and 
corruption.59 Kurdish political parties have drawn on nation-
alist moral populism to dominate civil society.60 However, 
this influence does not equate to absolute control over civil 
society.61
Independent media flourished after 2003. This helped pro-
duce a more pluralistic national narrative, challenged the 
Kurdish political elites for control over historic memory, and 
gave civic and political opposition groups new platforms 
to publicise their ideas and grievances to a much larger 
audience.62 However, many independent outlets closed in 
subsequent years as the Kurdish parties consolidated their 
authority and control. The political elite have also created 
a ‘shadow media’63 that purports to be independent but is 
the Nation’, Arab Reform Initiative Policy Alternatives. Available at: 
https://www.arab-reform.net/en/node/1328.
58  ‘Iraq’s Civil Society Assessment’, USAid Iraq (February 2012). Avail-
able at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadz188.pdf. 
59  ‘Iraq’s Civil Society in Perspective’, NGO Coordination Committee 
for Iraq (April 2011). Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.
int/files/resources/Full_Report_476.pdf.
60  Nadje Al-Ali and Nicola Pratt, ‘Between nationalism and women’s 
rights: the Kurdish women’s movement in Iraq’, Middle East Journal 
of Culture and Communication 4 (2011), pp. 339–55; Nadje Al-Ali 
and Nicola Pratt, ‘Conspiracy of Near Silence: Violence against Iraqi 
Women’, Middle East Report (2011), pp. 34–48.
61  Thomas von der Osten-Sacken, ‘Working Paper: Iraqi-Kurdistan; 
a Model for Iraq?’, Aspen Conference: Greater Middle East (March 
2006). Available at: http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/3166/.
62  Nicole F. Watts, ‘Democracy and Self-Determination in the Kurdis-
tan Region of Iraq’, in David Romano and Mehmet Gurses (eds), Con-
flict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq, and Syria (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 141–68.
63  ‘Politics, Money and War – Independent Media in Iraqi Kurdistan’, 
Doha Center for Freedom, 28 January 2015. Available at: http://
www.dc4mf.org/en/news/politics-money-and-war-independent-me-
dia-in-iraqi-kurdistan/.
actually affiliated to political parties.64 This accounts for ap-
proximately 57 percent of the media landscape in the KRI.65
In recent years, the KRG has experienced a series of popu-
lar protests, particularly in and around the city of Sulaimani. 
Anti-government demonstrations took place in 2011 to 
challenge the KDP–PUK traditional power structures and 
the entrenched patronage systems.66 In 2014, the KRG 
delayed salary payments to civil servants, sparking large 
protests especially by teachers’ unions.67
There have been several rounds of post-referendum 
protests that exhibit both similarities to and differences 
from the protests of 2011. They are similar in that people 
continue to protest for salary payment, jobs and economic 
opportunity. However, they are now increasingly directed 
against political parties and elites, more aggressive and 
chaotic, and most significantly, take place in Erbil and Do-
huk, which has not occurred since 2003. In addition, the high 
level of violent repression against the protestors by PUK 
and KDP security forces was not seen in previous protests. 
The increased intensity of the protests stems from Kurdish 
anger and frustration toward the failures of the ruling elites 
during and after the referendum.68
Gender in Iraq
The insecurity, conflict and economic deprivation that 
followed the invasion of 2003 have significantly affected 
women, their rights and the overall status of gender equal-
ity in Iraq. The impact of the intervention and its aftermath 
has been mostly negative for Iraqi women; they have 
become more exposed to violence and their socio-eco-
nomic rights have deteriorated. These outcomes have been 
exasperated by irresponsible and short-term policies.69
64  Afshin Ismaeli, ‘The Role of The Media in Developing Democracy 
in Kurdistan: A study of Rudaw Journalists Perspectives, Notions 
and Attitudes’, Masters Dissertation, University of Oslo (2015); Kamal 
Chomani, ‘Independent media fades in Iraqi Kurdistan’, Al-Monitor, 2 
August 2014. Available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origi-
nals/2014/07/iraq-kurdistan-free-independent-media-krg-rudaw.ht. 
65  Ibid.
66  Watts, ‘Democracy and Self-Determination in the Kurdistan Region 
of Iraq’.
67  Isabel Coles and Stephen Kalin, ‘In Fight against Islamic State, 
Kurds Expand their Territory’, Reuters, 10 October 2016. Available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-
kurds-land.
68  Van den Toorn, ‘Kurdistan Politics at a Crossroads’.
69  Nadje Al-Ali, ‘Sexual Violence in Iraq: Challenges for Transnational 
Feminist Politics’, European Journal of Women’s Studies 25/1 (2016), 
pp. 10–27.
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There is no denying that Iraq has always been a difficult 
context for women to push for improving their status. How-
ever, Iraqi women’s rights activism has a long history and 
the current struggle for women’s rights has built on this 
tradition,70 becoming increasingly connected with trans-
national women’s rights activism.71 Conflict, war, political 
transition, economic sanctions and increasing social con-
servatism have posed significant obstacles for women.72 
For instance, economic decline during the sanctions period 
(1990–2003) restricted women’s ability to participate in 
education and the labour force, reinforced conservative 
gender roles, impacted family relations, and led to in-
creased violence.73 Therefore, the decades preceding the 
2003 invasion had already led to the erosion of women’s 
socio-economic rights.74 The 2003 invasion and what fol-
lowed served to worsen women’s already poor situation.
Introduced in 2005, the gender quota system in elections 
and in parliament promised change but remained symbolic, 
with women’s rights still largely overlooked. The lack of 
a coherent policy to meaningfully include women in the 
political processes and the use of women as bargaining 
chips in political negotiations with religious parties had 
far-reaching and detrimental effects. The US gave in to the 
more conservative demands of the new political elite in 
the bargaining surrounding the reform process.75 Women’s 
presence in parliament did not change general perceptions 
about women’s positions in politics and did not lead to 
greater democratisation. The policy of democracy pro-
motion marginalised and excluded women’s movements 
that challenged male dominance in society or opposed the 
invasion.76 
70  Noga Efrati, Women in Iraq: Past Meets Present (Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2012).
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Moreover, the inability of public authorities to provide secu-
rity has confined women to their homes and increased their 
vulnerability to threats of sexual violence and abduction.77 
The sectarian justification for the civil war that followed 
the invasion encouraged lawlessness and the emergence 
of other forms of gender control. Rising hyper-masculin-
ity due to conflict led to an increase in domestic violence 
against women as well as the use of violence by public 
authorities. For instance, vigilantes employed by Muqtada 
al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army imposed strict rules, forced women 
to wear full-length veils, forbade music, make-up or being 
too vocal in public, and enforced gender segregation.78 
Conflict and instability also exacerbated the underlying 
structural factors in economic, social, family and political 
spheres that foster patriarchy and hinder equality. Indeed, 
there is continuity between pre- and post-2003 violence 
against women and violence in general. The socio-political 
environment under the Baʿath was deeply imbued with 
violence. Today’s sexual violence against women and men, 
including the violence perpetrated by Daʿesh, emulates 
practices that have been endemic in Iraq for decades.79 
Significant correlations can be identified between ‘hon-
our’ killings, state ideologies and notions of masculinity. 
However, the transformation of Iraq from a largely secular 
dictatorship to a sectarian state placed new limits on wom-
en’s presence in the public sphere and increased control 
over women’s bodies in public. Changes in the legal rules 
governing family and personal status has further violated 
the principles of the Convention on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women (CEDAW) and has negatively 
affected women and their status.80 
Domestic and conflict-related violence is a key issue faced 
by women in Iraq.81 The violation of women’s human rights 
and legal discrimination against women and the LGBTQ 
77  Catherine Powell, ‘The Status of Women and Girls in Iraq and 
Afghanistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 3 July 2014. Available at: 
https://www.cfr.org/blog-post/status-women-and-girls-iraq-and-af-
ghanistan-0; Haifa Zangana, ‘Walling in Iraq: The Impact on Baghdadi 
Women’, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 4/1 
(August 2010), pp. 41–58.
78  Huda Ahmed, ‘Women in the Shadows of Democracy’, Middle East 
Report 36 (2006), p. 24.
79  Ariel I. Ahram, ‘Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS’, Survival 57 
(2015), pp. 57–78.
80  Riyadh K. Lafta, Atheer J. Al‐Saffar, Sahar A. Eissa and Maha A. Al‐
Nuaimi, ‘Gender-based Violence: A Study of Iraqi Women’, Internation-
al Social Science Journal 59/192 (2009), pp. 309–16.
81  ‘Iraq: MENA Gender Equality Profile – Status of Girls and Women’, 
UNICEF Report (2011). Available at: https://www.unicef.org/gender/
files/Iraq-Gender-Eqaulity-Profile-2011.pdf.
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community have clearly increased since 2003.82 Protec-
tion against torture, sexual attacks and ill treatment are 
not effective.83 The deteriorating situation of women and 
limitations placed on gender equality in the design of the 
Constitution and drafting of laws after 2005 have increased 
violence against women and gendered vulnerabilities.84
Another issue that significantly affects women in Iraq is dis-
placement.85 Displacement impacts women more severely 
than men due to their social status, discrimination and mar-
ginalisation.86 Displaced women experience higher levels of 
domestic and other forms of violence than women who are 
not displaced. They are also more vulnerable to trafficking 
and prostitution.87 Displacement in Iraq also increased 
communal and family-level restrictions placed on women 
to ensure security and to avoid the stigma associated with 
certain incidents or behaviours. These limit displaced wom-
en’s visibility and presence in public spaces, their access 
to services, support and information, and confine them to 
domestic spaces in their new location.
The KRI has made greater strides towards gender equality 
than the federal GoI, with CEDAW principles and the Wom-
en, Peace and Security agenda internalised to a greater 
82  ‘They Want Us Exterminated’: Murder, Torture, Sexual Orientation 
and Gender in Iraq’, Human Rights Watch, 17 August 2009. Available 
at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/08/17/they-want-us-exterminat-
ed/murder-torture-sexual-orientation-and-gender-iraq.
83  ‘Working Together to Address Violence Against Women and Girls 
in Iraqi Kurdistan’, International Rescue Committee Report (2012); 
‘Trapped by Violence: Women in Iraq’, Amnesty International Report, 
20 April 2009. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
news/2009/04/atrapadas-violencia-mujeres-irak-20090420/.
84  American Bar Association, ‘The Status of Women in Iraq: Update 
to the Assessment of Iraq’s International Legal Standards’, Iraq Legal 
Development Project (2007). Available at: https://www.americanbar.
org/advocacy/rule_of_law/where_we_work/middle_east/iraq/news/
news-iraq-womens-assessment-update.html; Carolyn A. Dubay, 
‘Beyond Critical Mass: A Comparative Perspective on Judicial Design 
and Gender Equality in Iraq and Afghanistan’, Florida Journal of Inter-
national Law 24/1 (2012), p. 163.
85  ‘Women in Iraq Factsheet – Displaced Women and Women in 
Conflict’, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq Report (2015). 
Available at: http://www.uniraq.com/index.php?lang=en.
86  Zeynep N. Kaya and Kyra Luchtenberg, ‘Displacement and 
Women’s Economic Empowerment: Voices of Displaced Women in 
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’, Women for Women International (April 
2018). Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87686/.
87  ‘‘‘We Just Keep Silent” Gender-Based Violence amongst Syrian 
Refugees in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’, UNAMI and UN Women 
(April 2014). Available at: http://www.uniraq.com/index.php?op-
tion=com_k2&view=item&id=1913:we-just-keep-silent-gender-
based-violence-amongst-syrian-refugees-in-the-kurdistan-region-
of-iraq&Itemid=626&lang=en.
extent in regional laws and regulations. Women’s rights 
activism and some policymakers’ willingness to realise 
change have played an important role in this. However, dis-
criminatory rules and practices still exist, violence against 
women and ‘honour’ killings continue, and legal changes 
are not fully implemented or monitored by the KRG.88 The 
state of the literature on women in Iraq reflects a heavier 
focus on the KRI. This is mainly due to the inaccessibility 
of other parts of Iraq and security risks involved in carrying 
out research. The specific focus on the KRI is also driven 
by the differences in political, economic and societal pro-
cesses between the two contexts. 
Gender, Public Authority, Moral Populism and 
the Political Marketplace
Public authority in Iraq is highly gendered. It is based upon 
a patriarchal form of masculinity embedded in all aspects 
of society from the way in which public institutions are 
structured to the management of war, distribution of 
resources and interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, and 
men and women’s roles in public and private life. The level 
of patriarchal influence in politics, society and the economy 
have varied throughout Iraq’s history. Dominant modes of 
masculine state and non-state authority connect sexual 
control and men’s control over the bodies and behaviours 
of women and girls with ethno-sectarian hierarchy, this 
being an important source of violence, including sexual 
violence, and control. Sexual violence carried out under the 
pretext of security in prisons is an example of this. During 
the US occupation and civil war, most women held in pris-
ons and Ministry of Defence facilities were Sunni and some 
experienced sexual assaults including rape.89
Moral populism has defined women’s roles and positions 
in public and private life in Iraq. Moral populism has clear 
gendered dimensions with conservative interpretations 
of Islamic tradition framing gender attitudes and practic-
es. Public authorities reproduce and institutionalise the 
gendered dimensions of religious sectarianism and these 
dimensions in turn reinforce their authority. Although 
conservative attitudes are increasing in certain segments 
of Kurdish society, the KRG has adopted a form of moral 
populism that draws upon contemporary global norms on 
gender equality to strengthen its international standing and 
to ensure continuing external financial and political support. 
88  ‘Minoo Alinia, Honor and Violence against Women in Iraqi Kurdistan 
(New York: Palgrave, 2013); Zeynep N. Kaya, ‘Gender and Statehood 
in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’, LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series 
18 (2017).
89  Ariel I Ahram, ‘Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS’, Survival 57 
(2015), pp. 57–78, at pp. 63–64.
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Gender norms also contribute to the emergence and 
perpetuation of the political marketplace. Economies of 
war and conflict are increasingly informal. According to Pe-
terson, the following economic activities can be observed 
in Iraq: coping economies based on the survival needs 
of individuals and families; combat economies related 
to military objectives and facilitating insurgent activities; 
and criminal economies as a result of the breakdown of 
regulatory mechanisms and profit seeking behaviour.90 
Structured gendered hierarchies and patriarchal rules push 
women into the role of keeping households. Simultaneous-
ly, female-led households increased due to militarisation, 
conflict-related injuries and deaths. 
Two CRP research projects focus on gender in Iraq. The 
first will examine how masculinity and gender norms 
are contested and manipulated, and how they shape the 
conflict economy in Iraq. The second will study the role 
increasing social and political conservatism play in the 
deterioration of women’s status in Iraq.
However, there is a danger that studies looking at these 
issues assume causal links between moral populism and 
the suppression of women, neglecting the analysis of polit-
ical, economic, social, class-related and geographic factors 
and their interaction. To avoid this, CRP research will adopt 
an intersectional approach to better understand complex 
causality.
Internally Displaced People
Authoritarian rule, violent persecution and war have led 
millions of Iraqis to flee their homes over the past decades. 
From Baʿathist-era Arabisation policies to military and sec-
tarian induced displacement after 2003, the country has 
witnessed multiple waves of protracted displacement as 
well as migration.91 The latest wave of displacement was 
caused by violence related to Daʿesh, the cumulative effect 
of which was to create in excess of 5 million IDPs. 
90  Spike Peterson, ‘Gendering Informal Economies in Iraq’, in Nicola 
Pratt and Nadje Al-Ali (eds), Women and War in the Middle East: 
Transnational Perspectives (London: Zed Books, 2009), p. 35.
91  Ibrahim Sirkeci, ‘Conflict, the Environment of Human Insecurity and 
Migration in Iraq in the Aftermath of 2003’ in Helga Rittersberger-Tılıç 
(ed.), Rethinking Global Migration: Practices, Policies and Discourses 
in the European Neighbourhood (Ankara: KORA – Center for Black Sea 
and Central Asia and Middle East Technical University), pp. 161–75; 
Björn Rother, Gaëlle Pierre, et al., ‘The Economic Impact of Conflicts 
and the Refugee Crisis in the Middle East and North Africa’, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (September 2016). Available at: https://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1608.pdf.
Despite the end of military operations against Daʿesh in 
December 2017, many IDPs remain unwilling to return 
home due to security fears, damaged property, lack of 
employment and poor service provision.92 As of 31 Decem-
ber 2017, according to the International Organization for 
Migration’s (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix, there are 
2.6 million IDPs still displaced, while 3.2 million IDPs have 
returned, albeit often to terrible conditions. With destroyed 
local governance structures, property conflict and the 
absence of any national plan to coordinate the processes 
of reconstruction and reintegration, IDP return has fueled 
conflictual majority–minority dynamics.93
The slow rate of return of Sunni Arab IDPs to historically 
mixed areas is partly the result of the ongoing presence of 
the Shiʿa-dominated Hashd al-Shaʿabi, Asaʾib Ahl al-Haq, 
and Badr Brigades. Sunni Arab and Kurdish communities 
have reported abuses and forced evictions by these groups 
since 2014. Militias, as well as Shiʿa tribal authorities, have 
resisted or demanded payments for the return of Sunni 
IDPs. These intercommunal conflicts cannot be viewed in 
isolation from other conditions preventing return. 
IDPs and Moral Populism
Internal displacement is a key driver of conflict in Iraq. Con-
flicting relations between host and IDP communities have 
exacerbated ethno-nationalist narratives, and political lead-
ers have blatantly framed displacement within ethno-sec-
tarian discourses. At the same time, internal displacement 
has resulted in increased sectarian homogeneity, since 
there is often protective benefit associated with living in a 
homogenous community. However, the increasing geo-
graphic segregation of Iraq’s communities has cultivated 
sectarianism, especially among the young.94
Distrust of Sunni Arabs is both a driver and consequence of 
post-2014 displacement. The fight against Daʿesh exacer-
bated historical sectarian fears as well as internal divides 
between and within Sunni and Shiʿa communities. The 
trauma of recent years and the hatred felt towards Daʿesh 
often manifests itself in hostility towards those families 
who are believed to be affiliated to the group. Sunni Arabs 
92  ‘IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)’, International Organiza-
tion for Migration (2017). Available at: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/.
93  Omar Abdel-Razek and Miriam Puttick, ‘Majorities and minorities in 
post-ISIS Iraq’, Contemporary Arab Affairs 9 (2016), pp. 565–76.
94  ‘Fight or Flight: The Desperate Plight of Iraq’s Generation 2000’, In-
ternational Crisis Group Middle East Report 169, 8 August 2016, p. 11. 
Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/
gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/fight-or-flight-desperate-plight-iraq-s-
generation-2000.
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lament that they are excluded while displaced and after 
returning due to their assumed collective guilt. In some ar-
eas, they have alleged that Shiʿa militias used the presence 
of Daʿesh as a pretext for forcing out the Sunni population.
Movement restrictions imposed on Sunni Arabs have ce-
mented the division of Iraq, effectively locking Sunnis into 
the country’s least safe areas and denying some families a 
solution to protracted displacement. Restrictions on move-
ment partly explain disparities in the population of IDPs 
across receiving provinces. 348,552 IDPs of Ninewa origin 
currently reside in Dohuk, while less than a quarter of that 
number, reside in the larger and better-serviced province 
of Erbil.95 While both provinces border Ninewa, the check-
points at the entrances to the capital Erbil are known to be 
among the most stringent towards Sunni Arabs.
Kirkuk has become a particularly important flashpoint 
for a sectarian politicisation of the IDP crisis. Since 2015, 
Kurdish politicians have rejected moves by the federal Min-
istry of Interior to grant IDPs residing in Kirkuk residence, 
describing it as a new wave of the Saddam-era policy of 
Arabisation. In October 2016 and May 2017, reports indi-
cated that Kurdish security forces forced hundreds of Arab 
and Turkmen IDP families to leave Kirkuk and return to their 
areas of origin. In the wake of the October 2017 takeover 
of Kirkuk by federal government forces, talk of Arabisation 
has only increased as Kurdish forces no longer hold influ-
ence over the city’s demographic makeup.
IDPs and the Political Marketplace
Since 2003, all actors with a political stake in Iraq, from 
state and non-state armed groups to the US-led Multina-
tional Force, have engaged in the distribution of assistance 
on the basis of political gain rather than need.96 Iraqi polit-
ical elites have used internal displacement as a tool to se-
cure funds for their patronage networks. Charitable entities 
connected to political party figures or community leaders 
have proliferated; these entities receive large amounts of 
international aid under the pretence of responding to the 
needs of IDPs or conducting other civil society activity, but 
in fact redirect money to their patronage networks, includ-
ing to families of militia volunteers.97 
There has also been an upsurge in displacement-related 
corruption. The requirement for the support of a local spon-
95  ‘IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)’, International Organiza-
tion for Migration (2018). Available at: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/.
96  Dina Abou Samra, ‘Military-Induced Displacement’, Forced Migra-
tion Review Iraq Special Issue 37 (June 2007).
97  ‘Fight or Flight’.
sor for IDP entry into safe areas has enabled extractive  
corruption schemes and civil servants have imposed 
arbitrary fees for IDP registration and documentation re-
newal.98 For returnees to Ninewa and other areas formerly 
under Daʿesh control, much of the cynicism about the 
prospect of reconstruction is rooted in a widespread dis-
trust of corrupt government schemes drawing profit from 
infrastructure and building projects.
IDPs and Public Authority
Displacement in Iraq is associated with a breakdown in 
trust between citizens and their government. IDPs cannot 
rely on state institutions for even their most basic needs. 
The ability of IDPs to participate in political processes, or 
to secure access to property and documentation, is also 
constrained.99 The inability of the Iraqi state to protect 
IDPs – as well as non-displaced citizens – has forced them 
to rely on non-state armed groups affiliated with their eth-
no-sectarian group.100 This is a risk because in the past rival 
militias have been the ones to enforce segregation and the 
creation of ethnic boundaries.101 Despite these problems, 
there remains a significant lack of coordination between 
Baghdad and Erbil on the question of IDP response102 
reflecting the profound division between the two capitals.
IDPs suffer from an ambiguous legal status in host prov-
inces. IDPs without civil documentation have struggled to 
move across checkpoints and access state food rations, 
health care and other public services. They are often told 
to return to their province of origin to access documenta-
tion, which is impossible for most. The UNHCR and other 
groups have worked to ease this process, but 49 percent of 
IDPs reported problems with accessing civil identification.
98  Ahmed Hassin and Mays Al-Juboori, ‘Humanitarian Challenges 
in Iraq’s Displacement Crisis’, Minority Rights Group International, 
December 2016. Available at: http://minorityrights.org/2016/12/22/
iraqs-displacement-crisis-unsustainable-return-home-distant-pros-
pect-new-report-humanitarian-challenges-facing-idps/.
99  Jamille Bigio and Jen Scott, ‘Internal Displacement in Iraq: The 
Process of Working toward Durable Solutions’, Brookings Institution–
University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, June 2009.
100  Ashraf al-Khalidi and Victor Tanner, ‘Sectarian Violence: 
Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq’, Brookings 
Institution—University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement 
(2006). Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/06/1018iraq_al-khalidi.pdf.
101  Philip Marfleet, ‘Displacement and the State – The Case of Iraq’, 
in Khalid Koser and Susan Martin (eds), The Migration–Displacement 
Nexus: Patterns, Processes, and Policies (2011), p. 96.
102  Cameron Thibos, ‘35 Years of Forced Displacement in Iraq: 
Contexualising the ISIS Threat, Unpacking the Movements’, Migration 
Policy Centre Policy Briefs 4 (2014).
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The forced displacement of IDPs has become a strategy 
used by both governments to renegotiate power dynamics, 
especially in the disputed territories.103 For example, since 
2015, security actors in both central Iraq and the KRG have 
confined thousands of Arab IDPs fleeing Daʿesh territory 
to ‘security zones’, where they are prevented from moving 
elsewhere or returning to their homes. Across the disputed 
territories, this mechanism led to demographic change 
when Kurdish security forces allowed Kurdish IDPs to 
return but denied Arab IDPs the required security clearance. 
There are also reports that after Kurdish families returned 
to the disputed territories, they were permitted to move into 
homes of Arabs who fled.104
Displacement has also contributed to the weakening of 
community and tribal links.105 From an economic perspec-
tive, the erosion of kinship networks, particularly in commu-
nities where network-based coping mechanisms served as 
insurance policies, has significantly diminished individual 
resilience.106
IDPs and ‘Civicness’
While IDPs have traditionally been vulnerable within host 
communities and political participation has been a chal-
lenge, there have been instances of either IDP protest or 
the use of the IDP cause in protests.107 There are localised 
women’s organisations at community level, both religious 
and secular in character; but these small initiatives general-
ly remain short-term, localised and untapped. 
103  ‘Humanitarian Implications of Violence in Northern and Central 
Iraq’, ACAPS Briefing Note, September 2014. Available at: https://
www.acaps.org/special-report/humanitarian-implications-vio-
lence-northern-and-central-iraq.
104  ‘Iraqi Kurdistan: Ruling Party Forces Fire on Protesters’, Hu-
man Rights Watch (2015). Available at: https://www.hrw.org/
news/2015/10/21/iraqi-kurdistan-ruling-party-forces-fire-protesters.
105  Nasir Ahmed Al Samaraie, ‘Humanitarian Implications of the Wars 
in Iraq’, International Review of the Red Cross 89/868, pp. 929–42.
106  Ali A K Ali, ‘Displacement in a fragile Iraq’, Forced Migration Review 
58 (2013).
107  Al-Khalidi and Tanner, ‘Sectarian Violence’.
Iraq’s Disputed Territories
The dispute over territory between the GoI and the KRG is 
one of the most intractable issues in Iraq.108 The disputed 
territories are a 480-kilometre swathe of land stretching 
from the Iranian border to the Syrian border with Kirkuk at 
the centre, containing a diverse mix of Arabs, Kurds and 
ethno-religious minorities. The dispute involves competing 
political, economic and communal dynamics, including, 
crucially, the position of Kurds and their long-term aspira-
tions to self-determination.
The Disputed Territories and Moral Populism
Behind the ostensibly technical question of who rightfully 
governs the disputed territories lurks more fundamental 
concerns of identity and nationhood.109 Moral populism is 
expressed through ethno-political narratives, rallying Arabs, 
Kurds and other minorities under exclusivist banners.110 
The dispute over Kirkuk, for example, is framed as a matter 
of Kurdish ethno-nationalism, as political elites describe it 
as the ‘Kurds’ Jerusalem’.111 In addition, the 2009 Kurdish 
Constitution provocatively asserts ‘the Kurds’ aspirations 
to take full control of areas they consider to be part of a 
Kurdish national homeland, including Kirkuk’.112
Similarly, GoI elites have used nationalist discourses to 
support their approach, presenting GoI control of the dis-
puted territories as necessary for the integrity and survival 
of the Iraqi nation. The sentiment is so strong that it has 
unified Sunni and Shiʿa Arab parties on this issue since 
2003. At the local level, Arab populations fear that their own 
interests will be undermined by a shift in power from the 
GoI to the KRG.113
108  ‘Iraq and the Kurds’; ‘Iraq’s New Battlefront’; Kane, ‘Iraq’s Disputed 
Territories’; Bartu, ‘Wrestling with the Integrity of a Nation’; Dan-
iel Coats, ‘Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 
Community’, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 11 May 2017. 
Available at: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/os-coats-051117.pdf.
109  Bartu, ‘Wrestling with the Integrity of a Nation’.
110  Arbella Bet-Shlimon, ‘Group Identities, Oil, and the Local Political 
Domain in Kirkuk: A Historical Perspective’, Journal of Urban History 
38 (2012), pp. 914–31.
111  Aram Rafaat, ‘Kirkuk: The Central Issue of Kurdish Politics and 
Iraq’s Knotty Problem’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 28/2 (2008), 
pp. 251–66.
112  Michael J. Kelly, ‘The Kurdish Regional Constitutional within the 
Framework of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A Struggle for Sovereign-
ty, Oil, Ethnic Identity, and the Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy 
Clause’, Penn State Law Review 114/3 (2010), pp. 707–808.
113  Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk: The ethno-
politics of conflict and compromise (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009).
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The use of ethno-nationalist discourse in this context is 
problematic because it constrains the ability of Kurdish and 
Arab elites to compromise and negotiate, and it justifies 
the implementation of exclusivist policies in mixed areas.114 
The conflict over the disputed territories is thus legitimised 
through moral populism. The KRG’s maximalist approach 
is also sustained by articulating a ‘compensatory’ dis-
course: the return of the disputed territories is presented 
as justice for every historic wrong done to them by the Iraqi 
state. Kurdish leaders argue that decades of Arabisation 
and forced migration made them a minority in their historic 
homeland; hence they have a right to reverse these crimes 
and repopulate the areas with Kurds.115
In recent years, shifts in Iraqi and Kurdish moral populisms 
– a rejection of Shiʿa sectarianism and Kurdish nationalism 
among some segments of the population – stemming 
from the failure on both sides to govern and achieve stabil-
ity and prosperity for their people, may ebb the competing 
moral populist claims, ethnicity and sect-based nation-
alisms, and hence inflame the conflict in the disputed 
territories.
The Disputed Territories and the Political  
Marketplace
Competition over Iraq’s disputed territories has been 
characterised by coercion, corruption and patronage at the 
national, regional, and local levels. A particularly intense 
use of those practices can be observed locally, where 
rivals seek to win the hearts and votes of local populations 
through government jobs, handouts from parties and gifts 
of land and houses.116 While the GoI and Kurdish political 
parties have been reluctant to invest in infrastructure, they 
have not hesitated to line the pockets of local notables with 
money for votes and loyalty.
At the national level, while claims to the disputed territories 
are usually rooted in moral populism, much of the litera-
ture argues that the real source of conflict is underground, 
114  Mahir Aziz, The Kurds of Iraq: Ethnonationalism and National 
Identity in Iraqi Kurdistan (New York: IB Tauris, 2011).
115  Silke Jungbluth, ‘The Future of Iraqi Kurdistan: The “Islamic State” 
as a Catalyst for Independence?’, Åland Islands Peace Institute, 
August 2015. Available at: http://www.peace.ax/images/Silke_
Jungbluth_Working_Paper_Kurdistan_FINAL.pdf.
116  ‘Banished and Dispossessed: Forced Displacement and Deliberate 
Destruction in Northern Iraq’, Amnesty International Report, 20 
January 2016. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
mde14/3229/2016/en/; ‘Where Are We Supposed to Go? Destruction 
and Forced Displacement in Kirkuk’, Amnesty International Report, 
7 November 2016. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/docu-
ments/mde14/5094/2016/en/.
since the disputed territories host some of Iraq’s richest 
oil and gas reserves. The KRG’s oil exploration blocs are all 
centred around the disputed territories, namely in Ninewa, 
Kirkuk and Salah al-Din.117 These resources are essential 
to the Kurdish nationalist project, since they represent the 
only avenue for economic self-sufficiency in the short- to 
medium-term.
The contraction of public payroll in Erbil and Baghdad, 
federal reassertion over oil fields in Kirkuk and other disput-
ed territories, and changes in moral populism and public 
authority may limit each capital’s ability to maintain and 
expand their claims via coercion, patronage and oil revenue 
in the future.
The Disputed Territories and Public Authority
Constitutional authority to resolve the disputed territories 
issue does exist; however, the language is vague and polit-
ical actors have never developed workable mechanisms or 
institutions to implement this authority.118 Multiple attempts 
to resolve the issue have been made over the years but 
have not been successful, undermined by intransigence on 
the part of both governments.119 This has created a vacu-
um in terms of security and governance because neither 
government takes responsibility for territories that are not 
fully loyal to them or under their control.
In terms of local administration, the GoI has de jure au-
thority over the disputed territories. The approach of the 
central government since the 1930s has been to try and 
Arabise these areas by expelling Kurds and other minori-
ties and repopulating them with Arabs from southern Iraq. 
In 2003, the tables turned as Peshmerga forces seized 
large swathes of the disputed territories, often with the 
support of US Special Forces, and managed to partially 
reverse Arabisation.120 A weak and distracted government 
117  ‘Iraq Oil and Gas Outlook’, Hannam and Partners (2015). Available 
at: http://www.hannamandpartners.com/uploads/2015/10/Iraq.pdf.
118  Saad Naji Jawad, ‘The Iraqi Constitution: Structural Flaws and 
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com/the-iraqi-crisis-a-return-on-social-trajectories; Arthur Quesnay, 
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and Institutional System?’, Institute for Research and Debate on 
Governance, 25 February 2015. Available at: http://www.institut-gou-
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120  ‘Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq’, 
Human Rights Watch (2004). Available at: https://www.hrw.org/
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in Baghdad allowed the KRG to gradually expand its control 
over the territories and populations in dispute.121 This was 
exacerbated in 2014 when, overwhelmed by the violence of 
Daʿesh, Iraqi security forces conceded even more territory 
to Kurdish security forces. Subsequently, the KRG used its 
military presence to forcibly remove Arab citizens, in an 
effort to manipulate demographics in their favour.122 Ulti-
mately, what this means is that reversing Arabisation and 
then Kurdification policies in the disputed territories cannot 
happen without forced displacement.123
The crisis caused by Daʿesh and the failure of both govern-
ments to protect vulnerable communities triggered a pro-
liferation of armed groups across the disputed territories. 
Both the central government and the KRG have created, 
funded and armed local proxy militias, or made them offi-
cial battalions in the Peshmerga and Iraqi security forces.
Following the Kurdish independence referendum, on 16 
October 2017, the GoI launched an operation to restore 
Iraqi sovereignty over the disputed territories. The retreat of 
Kurdish security forces transformed the political geography 
of northern Iraq, much to the disadvantage of the Kurds, 
and reversed the control patterns in place since 2003.
The reassertion of federal authority in disputed territories 
has temporarily put an end to dueling administrations, but 
will require a settlement with the Kurds regarding service 
delivery and equitable treatment of Kurdish and pro-KRG 
populations so as to prevent a slip backwards into the 
previous status quo. 
The Disputed Territories and ‘Civicness’
Local populations in the disputed territories live side by 
side despite being from different communal groups with 
competing patrons. Cases of intermarriage and intercom-
munity economic dependence are not uncommon.124 Com-
munity leaders have also at times developed and imple-
mented mechanisms to constructively address or resolve 
disputes locally. However, these mechanisms and deals are 
121  Natali, ‘Are the Kurds Still Kingmakers in Iraq?’; Natali, Kurdish 
Quasi-State.
122  ‘Banished and Dispossessed’; ‘Where Are We Supposed to Go?’; 
Joost R. Hiltermann, ‘Spoils of Babylon’, The National Interest 105 
(2010), pp. 15–25.
123  Nathan J. Brown, ‘Iraq’s Constitutional Process Plunges Ahead’, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18 July 2005. Available 
at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2005/07/18/iraq-s-constitution-
al-process-plunges-ahead-pub-17206.
124  Christine van den Toorn and Nawaf Ashour, ‘Attacks on Harvest 
Workers in Northern Iraq Signal New Security Crisis’, Niqash, 29 May 
2014. Available at: http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/3445/.
temporary and fragile and cannot last without buy-in at the 
national level.125 Unfortunately, the wider GoI–KRG national 
dispute has consistently hindered localised efforts. Local 
communities are pushed and pulled, polarised by the GoI, 
the KRG and other national and security actors (both state 
and non-state).126 Competing patronage has fostered and 
aggravated political divisions by creating and funding civil 
society organisations that favour their own rule, while 
blocking those that do not.
In recent years, with the Daʿesh attack and its aftermath, 
social relations in some disputed areas have declined, as 
animosities and suspicions have sunk to the popular level. 
Nevertheless, the trauma of the past three years has also 
made local populations more united in their demands for 
autonomy over local government and security services, as 
well as less interested in which government – KRG or GOI 
– has ultimate authority over their lives.
125  Kane, ‘Iraq’s Disputed Territories’.
126  Christine van den Toorn, ‘The Wars after the War for Sinjar: How 
Washington Can Avert a New Civil War’, War on the Rocks, 20 June 
2016. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/the-wars-
after-the-war-for-sinjar-how-washington-can-avert-a-new-civil-war/; 
Christine van den Toorn, ‘Internal Divides behind the Kurdistan Ref-
erendum’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11 October 
2017. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/73359.
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